

2026

**LAW SOCIETY
OF KENYA**

**ELECTIONS
OBSERVATION
REPORT**



Prepared By
**Election
Observation Group**
Presented To
LSK Elections Board

www.elog.or.ke 

TABLE OF CONTENT

Forward..... 3

Introduction..... 5

Context of the 2026 LSK Elections..... 7

ELOG deployment Methodology..... 8

ELOG Observation Methodology..... 10

ELOG Observation Findings..... 12

 Opening Phase..... 12

 Voting Process Analysis..... 14

 Ballot Secrecy and Voting Environment..... 15

 Closing and Counting Process Environment..... 15

 Counting Process and Procedural Challenges..... 17

Incidences..... 18

Conclusion..... 19

Recommendations..... 21

Annexes..... 25

FOREWORD

The Law Society of Kenya (LSK) Elections 2026 were conducted pursuant to the Law Society of Kenya (General) Regulations, 2020, marking another important milestone in the Society's governance and leadership renewal process. The elections ushered in officials to serve for the 2026-2028 term across the various elective positions provided for under the LSK legal framework, including the President, Vice-President, Representatives of the General Membership, Upcountry Representatives, Nairobi Representatives, the Coast Representative and Advocate Disciplinary Tribunal Member.

The Elections Observation Group (ELOG), a permanent, citizen-led domestic election observation coalition, formally sought and was granted accreditation by the LSK Elections Board 2026-2028 pursuant to Regulation 33(2) of the LSK (General) Regulations, 2020. In a letter dated 14th February 2026, the Elections Board approved ELOG's request to observe the electoral process, subject to submission of a full list of observers and copies of their identification documents in compliance with the Data Protection Act (Cap. 411C).

In compliance with this requirement and guided by both statutory obligations and internal data protection policies, ELOG submitted the full list of deployed observers using unique ELOG Polling Station Identification (PSI) numbers in place of copies of National Identity Cards or Passports. Each PSI corresponds to verified identification records securely held by ELOG. This approach ensured accountability, traceability, and full cooperation with the Elections Board, while safeguarding personal data in line with the Data Protection Act.

ELOG has previously observed LSK elections in 2018 and 2024 and has consistently provided independent reports containing findings and recommendations aimed at strengthening institutional electoral processes. For the 2026 elections, ELOG deployed trained observers to selected polling stations and the national tallying center to systematically monitor compliance with the legal framework, adherence to polling guidelines, transparency of procedures, conduct of election officials, and respect for the Electoral Code of Conduct.

Ahead of the election, ELOG participated in the official stakeholder briefing convened by the Elections Board on Tuesday, 17th February 2026. The programme, chaired by the Elections Board Chairperson, provided an overview of polling guidelines, the Electoral Code of Conduct, and the operational conduct of elections. This engagement contributed to clarity of roles, expectations, and standards applicable to observers and other stakeholders.

Election observation remains a critical component of electoral integrity. It enhances transparency, builds stakeholder confidence, and promotes accountability in institutional governance processes. Through systematic observation, documentation, and analysis, ELOG assesses both compliance with established rules and the practical implementation of electoral procedures.

This 2026 Election Observation Report presents ELOG's independent and impartial assessment of the LSK electoral process. The report highlights commendable practices observed during the elections, identifies procedural or operational challenges where they arose, and offers practical recommendations aimed at strengthening future LSK elections.

ELOG extends its appreciation to the LSK Elections Board 2026-2028, the Secretariat, candidates, agents, and members of the Society, who facilitated access and engagement throughout the observation period. ELOG remains committed to promoting credible, transparent, inclusive, and accountable electoral processes.

PREPARATION & DATA-SECURE METHODOLOGY



Data-Protected Observer Accreditation

Used unique Polling Station Identification (PSI) numbers instead of personal IDs to ensure observer privacy.

Multi-Tiered Oversight

Utilized Mobile Expert Teams (METs) and a Central Depository Unit for real-time data verification.



Specialized Deployment Force

Deployed 20 Short-Term Observers and a 10-member Core Team to monitor 24 sampled polling stations.



ELECTION DAY PERFORMANCE & INTEGRITY

High Security & Agent Presence

91.7% of stations had security present, and 100% of executive races had candidate agents.



Security Present

Candidate Agents (Executive Races)



Prompt Incident Resolution

Only minor administrative issues occurred, all of which were resolved without disrupting the electoral process.



Ballot Boxes Shown Empty: **100%**



Ballot Box Seals Intact at Counting: **100%**




Voters in Queue at 5 PM Allowed to Vote: **100%**

INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings of the Elections Observation Group (ELOG) following its observation of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) Council Elections 2026-2028 and the concurrent election of Members to the Advocates Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT). The elections marked the conclusion of the 2024-2026 Council term and the transition to a new leadership cycle within the Law Society of Kenya.

ELOG, a permanent coalition of civil society and faith-based organizations dedicated to promoting credible, peaceful, free, and fair electoral processes in Kenya, formally applied for and was granted accreditation by the LSK Elections Board 2026–2028 pursuant to Regulation 33(2) of the LSK (General) Regulations, 2020. The accreditation required submission of a full list of observers and identification details in compliance with the Data Protection Act (Cap. 411C).

In accordance with statutory data protection requirements and its internal safeguards, ELOG submitted the list of deployed observers using unique Polling Station Identification (PSI) numbers in place of copies of National Identity Cards or Passports. These PSI numbers correspond to verified identification records securely held by ELOG, thereby ensuring accountability and traceability while protecting personal data.



Observers utilized structured data collection tools and standardized reporting templates to ensure consistency, accuracy, and impartiality in documenting proceedings. The data collected informed ELOG’s preliminary statements and forms the basis of this comprehensive final report.

ELOG has an established history of observing both national and institutional elections in Kenya, including the 2013, 2017, and 2022 General Elections, as well as previous LSK elections in 2018 and 2024. Through these engagements, ELOG has contributed to strengthening transparency, accountability, and stakeholder confidence in electoral processes across the country.

ELOG: Standardized Observation & Reporting Methodology



Objectives of the 2026 Observation Mission

The primary objectives of ELOG’s observation of the 2026 LSK elections were to:

- 

Promote Credible Elections
Foster credible, transparent, inclusive & peaceful elections.
- 

Assess Compliance
Evaluate adherence to legal & regulatory framework.
- 

Build Confidence
Enhance members' trust in the electoral process.
- 

Identify Areas for Improvement
Spot strengths & areas needing enhancement.
- 

Recommend Improvements
Provide practical recommendations for future elections.

This report provides an independent, impartial, and evidence-based evaluation of the 2026 Law Society of Kenya elections. It reflects ELOG’s enduring commitment to promoting credible, peaceful, free, and fair electoral processes within Kenya’s democratic and institutional spaces. As a citizen-led domestic observation coalition, ELOG approaches election observation not merely as a monitoring exercise, but as a contribution to strengthening transparency, accountability, and public confidence in governance systems.

Through systematic observation, rigorous data collection, and objective analysis, ELOG seeks to safeguard the principles of integrity, inclusivity, legality, and non-violence that underpin democratic processes. The assessment contained in this report is grounded strictly in verified observer findings and aligned with established legal and regulatory standards. In doing so, ELOG reaffirms its role as a neutral actor committed to constructive engagement rather than partisan interest.

By identifying both commendable practices and areas requiring refinement, ELOG contributes to a continuous improvement framework aimed at consolidating institutional electoral credibility and reinforcing trust in leadership renewal processes.

CONTEXT OF THE 2026 LSK ELECTIONS

Legal and Institutional Framework

The 2026 LSK elections were conducted within the framework established by the Law Society of Kenya Act and the Law Society of Kenya (General) Regulations. These instruments define the composition of the Council, eligibility criteria for candidates, nomination procedures, electoral timelines, and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Under Section 17 of the LSK Act, 2014, the Council comprises:

The 2026 Electoral Landscape

Ushering in the 2026–2028 leadership term under the mandate of the LSK Act, 2014

<div style="background-color: #0070c0; color: white; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;">President & Vice-President</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ 1 President ★ 1 Vice-President <div style="background-color: #0070c0; color: white; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;">Council Representatives</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 👥 General Membership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 (Above 25 Years Standing) • 2 (General) 🏙️ Nairobi <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 Representatives 📍 Upcountry <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 Representatives 🌊 Coast <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 Representative 	<div style="background-color: #0070c0; color: white; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;">Advocates Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT)</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⚖️ 1 Member <p style="margin-top: 20px;">The outgoing Council assumed office in March 2024 for a two-year term ending in March 2026. In accordance with Regulation 28(1) of the LSK (General) Regulations, 2020, the Secretary/Chief Executive Officer issued a notice declaring vacancies at least three months prior to the scheduled election date.</p>
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Declaration of Vacancies and Nomination Process

Following the formal declaration of vacancies, eligible and interested members of the Society were invited to submit nomination papers for the 2026-2028 term. The notice outlined the positions falling vacant and provided detailed guidance on eligibility, nomination procedures, and submission requirements.

Eligibility for election is guided by Sections 17 and 18 of the LSK Act, 2014, read together with Regulations 29 and 30 of the LSK (General) Regulations, 2020.

For the positions of President and Vice-President, candidates were required to:

- * Be members of the LSK; and
- * Be current or former Council members, or be qualified to serve as Judges of the Supreme Court.

For Council positions, candidates were required to:

- * Be members of the LSK;
- * Have been in practice for at least two years from the date of admission;

- * Not have been found liable for professional misconduct within the three years preceding the election; and
- * Meet the requirements of Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

Each candidate was required to be nominated by two eligible Society members, submit nomination papers for only one position, provide a brief candidate profile, attach passport-size photographs, and submit a duly signed and commissioned Candidate's Declaration of Compliance Form in accordance with the LSK Electoral Code of Conduct (Revised, 2019).

Completed nomination papers were submitted in hard copy to the Secretary/CEO at the LSK Secretariat within the stipulated deadline.

Scope of the 2026 Elections

In addition to the election of Council Members, the 2026 electoral process included the election of Members to the Advocates Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT), in accordance with the applicable regulatory provisions. This expanded the scope of the elections and increased the number of candidates participating in the process.

The 2026 LSK elections therefore represented a significant governance milestone for the Society, not only in renewing its Council leadership but also in strengthening institutional accountability mechanisms through the election of ADT members.

Within this context, ELOG's observation sought to assess the integrity, transparency, procedural compliance, and overall credibility of the electoral process, while documenting both best practices and areas requiring improvement for future electoral cycles.

ELOG DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGY

Mission Core Team

In the preparation phase of the 2026 Law Society of Kenya (LSK) Elections observation, ELOG laid the institutional and operational groundwork for the mission. The primary objective during this phase was to prepare for the observation exercise and assess compliance with applicable electoral laws, regulations, and LSK guidelines in order to contextualize the pre-election environment.

A Mission Core Team was constituted at the ELOG National Secretariat to lead the execution of the observation mission. The team comprised the Head of Secretariat, the Program Coordinator, the Electoral Processes Officer, the Central Depository Unit (CDU) Coordinator, and a Support Unit of six staff (two administrative officers and four field operations officers), bringing the total to ten members. All were stationed at the National Secretariat.

The Core Team was responsible for mapping and profiling polling stations; recruitment, vetting, and training of observers; development of training manuals and observation tools; establishment of a secure data reporting system; and overall database development for real-time monitoring and analysis. The team also coordinated logistical planning and internal communication structures to ensure operational readiness.

Engagement with key stakeholders formed an integral component of the pre-election phase. ELOG engaged

Observer Categories

To enhance operational efficiency and quality control, ELOG structured its deployment into distinct observer categories:



Central Depository Unit (CDU) Staff

Stationed at national secretariat to manage data reception, verification, & analysis.



Short-Term Observers (STOs)

Deployed to sampled polling stations to observe opening, voting, counting & declaration.



CDU Staff – Tallying Centre

Deployed to tallying centre to monitor results aggregation & verification procedures.



Mobile Expert Teams (METs)

Conducted spot checks & quality assurance visits at randomly selected polling stations.



Election Day Observation Overview



On Election Day

24 polling stations observed across diverse regions.



Arrived early, conducted phased and real-time reporting.

Interactive Reporting Database



- Secure database for real-time coded reporting & data analysis
- Standardized electronic forms
- Automated dashboards



- Secure database for real-time coded reporting & data analysis
- Standardized electronic forms
- Automated dashboards

the LSK Elections Board (2026-2028), Secretariat officials, candidates, and their teams to enhance clarity on polling procedures, observer access, and compliance standards. These engagements strengthened transparency, improved coordination, and facilitated smoother implementation of observation activities on Election Day.

Interim situational updates were prepared during this phase, highlighting emerging concerns and providing recommendations where necessary. These internal reports served as early warning and analytical tools, informing deployment strategies and guiding subsequent phases of the observation mission.

Short-Term Observers (STOs) Preparation

During the preparatory phase, ELOG recruited and deployed twenty (20) Short-Term Observers (STOs) drawn from diverse professional and regional backgrounds to ensure balanced and credible coverage of sampled polling stations and the tallying center. The selection process emphasized competence, integrity, and familiarity with electoral processes.

Observers underwent comprehensive training designed to standardize observation methodology and ensure uniform reporting. The training covered the legal framework governing the 2026 LSK elections; polling, counting, and results declaration procedures; observer roles, rights, and limitations; ethical standards and principles of impartiality; data collection methodology using coded reporting tools; and incident classification and escalation protocols.

Upon completion of training, observers were issued with official accreditation credentials, ELOG-branded identification badges (as required by the Elections Board), structured reporting templates, and a Code of Conduct to guide professional conduct throughout the mission.

ELOG'S OBSERVATION METHODOLOGY

Introduction

ELOG's observation methodology for the 2026 Law Society of Kenya (LSK) elections was grounded in internationally accepted principles of election observation, while being carefully adapted to the institutional and regulatory framework governing LSK elections. The methodology was designed to ensure a systematic, impartial, and professional assessment of all critical stages of the electoral process.

The observation framework covered the full Election Day cycle, including the opening and setup of polling stations, voting procedures, closing of polls, counting of votes, and tallying and declaration of results. Each phase was monitored using standardized tools and coded reporting templates to promote consistency and comparability of findings across locations.

Observation of Opening and Setup

During the opening phase, observers assessed the timeliness of polling station opening and compliance with prescribed preparatory procedures prior to the commencement of voting.

Observation focused on the presence and punctuality of polling officials; availability of ballot papers for all

contested positions; availability of manual voter registers; adequate supply of indelible ink; and proper arrangement of voting booths to guarantee secrecy of the ballot. Observers also assessed whether ballot boxes were transparently displayed as empty prior to sealing, and whether seal numbers were properly recorded before voting began.

Additional parameters included accessibility arrangements for persons with disabilities, and the presence of candidate agents and security personnel. Particular attention was given to whether presiding officers adhered strictly to sealing procedures and documented the corresponding seal numbers as required by regulation.

Observation of the Voting Process

The voting phase was observed to evaluate transparency, orderliness, and adherence to established procedures. Observers documented voter identification processes, including manual register verification using National Identity Cards or Passports, and assessed whether ballot papers were correctly issued for each contested position.

Assessment also covered the secrecy of the ballot, adequacy and positioning of voting booths, and proper application of indelible ink to prevent multiple voting. Observers examined queue management practices, including prioritization of vulnerable voters, and evaluated the conduct and presence of candidate agents.

In addition, observers assessed whether ballot boxes were clearly labeled or color-coded for different elective positions to minimize confusion during ballot casting.

Observation of Closing Procedures

During the closing phase, observers monitored whether polling stations closed at the officially designated time and whether voters who were in the queue before closing were permitted to cast their ballots.

Observers assessed the proper sealing of ballot boxes, accurate recording of seal numbers, completion of polling station documentation, and transparency of procedures in the presence of agents and observers. They also evaluated the secure transition from voting to counting to ensure the integrity of materials prior to tabulation.

Observation of Counting and Declaration of Results

The counting process was observed to determine compliance with established procedures, transparency standards, and accuracy requirements. Observers verified whether ballot box seals were intact before opening and whether the serial numbers corresponded to those recorded earlier in the day.

Observation further included sorting of ballots by elective position, transparent counting in the presence of agents and observers, appropriate handling of disputed or rejected ballots, and accurate recording of results on official declaration forms. Observers documented whether results were publicly announced at the polling station and whether results forms were securely transmitted or delivered to the tallying center.


ELOG’S OBSERVATION FINDINGS

Opening Phase: Institutional Transparency and Observer Deployment


Dataset Scope and Integrity

ELOG’s opening-phase analysis is based on **24 observer submissions** collected via the KoboToolbox platform on 19th February 2026.


Arrival Dynamics and Access Compliance



Branch-Level Distribution of Reports



Observation Footprint and Methodology



 **24** comprehensive observer submissions collected via **KoboToolbox**



Privacy Shield

Full compliance with the **Data Protection Act**—deployed unique **Polling Station Identification (PSI) numbers** in place of physical IDs to protect observer data while maintaining strict traceability.

Observation coverage reflected a strong concentration in Nairobi with two voting areas at the Milimani law courts and the Supreme court of Kenya premises having several voting centers. Other regions had one polling station per court premise, including at Coast Branch, Rift Valley Branch, North Rift Branch, West Kenya Branch, South West Kenya Branch, Mount Kenya Branch, South Eastern Branch. The ELOG observers highest concentration was in Nairobi County represented by 25% (**6 of 24**) of submissions, while the rest of the regions accounting for 75% (**18 of 24**) of total reports.

Dawn of Election Day: Setup and Readiness

6:00 AM



100%

Ballot boxes shown empty prior to sealing.

Consistent adherence to opening procedures. Manual voter registers, indelible ink, and ballots for all 9 positions were present and verified in front of agents.




0.83

Exceptionally low standard deviation in staffing allocation, indicating highly disciplined logistical planning by the Elections Board.

The low standard deviation (0.83) demonstrates remarkable uniformity in staffing allocation, indicating disciplined logistical planning and standardized deployment by the Law Society of Kenya Elections Board.


Personnel and Electoral Oversight

The Gender Baseline



66.6% of Presiding Officers were male. This exactly meets the two-thirds gender principle threshold, reflecting minimum technical compliance rather than proactive parity.

Agent Saturation Disparity



Note: Security personnel covered 91.7% of stations, utilizing a stream-sharing arrangement in multi-stream venues.

The Presiding Officer role shows a clear male skew, with men making up two-thirds of presiding officials. In terms of Kenya’s two-thirds gender principle, this distribution is technically compliant at the threshold: the higher gender share is 66.67%, which is exactly two-thirds. However, because it sits right at the limit, it reflects minimum compliance rather than strong inclusion.

Voting Process Analysis

Overview of Voting Procedures


The voting process was conducted under a manual identification and verification system in accordance with the Law Society of Kenya electoral framework. Observers assessed compliance with established procedures intended to safeguard transparency, accountability, and ballot integrity.

Voters were required to present either a valid National Identification Card or Passport for identification prior to being issued with ballot papers. Upon verification, eligible voters were crossed off the official voter register to prevent multiple voting.

Before issuance, ballot papers were stamped with the official election stamp to authenticate their validity. Voters were then issued ballot papers for all nine contested positions and directed to voting booths to mark their preferred candidates.

After casting their ballots, voters' fingers typically the small finger or the ridges of the index or middle finger were marked with indelible ink before exiting the polling station. This additional safeguard reinforced measures against repeat voting.

Observers generally reported consistent adherence to identification, verification, stamping, and inking procedures across sampled polling stations.



Assisted voting was reported in 4.17% of observed polling stations, representing a very low incidence rate.

Observers did not report any irregularities or undue influence in assisted voting instances. The process appeared to be conducted transparently and within procedural guidelines, with no indication of coercion or compromise of voter choice.

Ballot Secrecy and Voting Environment


Ballot secrecy remains a fundamental constitutional and procedural safeguard. While the voting process was generally orderly, 29.17% of observers reported instances where secrecy standards were not fully upheld (excluding assisted voting).

Reported concerns included suboptimal placement of voting booths, proximity of queues to voting areas that risked visibility of marked ballots, and spatial constraints within court facilities that limited ideal layout configurations.

Although no evidence of systematic manipulation or deliberate compromise of secrecy was observed, these structural limitations resulted in inconsistent application of secrecy standards in some locations. Addressing spatial planning challenges would further strengthen compliance in future elections.

The Spatial Secrecy Challenge

29.17% of observers reported instances where **ballot secrecy standards** were structurally **compromised**.



- Not caused by deliberate manipulation, but by **spatial constraints** within court facilities.
- **Suboptimal placement** of voting booths.
- **Proximity of queues** to voting areas risked the **visibility of marked ballots** across the 9 contested positions.

Closing and Counting Process Analysis

Closing Time Compliance

All observed polling stations (100%) confirmed that voters who were in the queue by the official closing time of 5:00 PM were allowed to cast their ballots before the stations formally closed.

This reflects full compliance with closing time regulations and adherence to the principle of protecting the voting rights of individuals present at the designated cut-off time. Observers did not report premature closure or denial of voting to eligible voters who were in the queue at the official closing hour.

Dusk: Closing the Polls and Securing the Box



100%

100% Queue Allowance

Every eligible voter in line by the **official 5:00 PM closing time** was **permitted to cast their ballot**. No premature closures were recorded.



100%

100% Seal Verification

Ballot box seals remained **completely intact** across all sampled stations, with **serial numbers verified** by candidate agents prior to opening.



Ballot Box Integrity and Seal Verification

Observers confirmed that ballot box seals were intact in all sampled polling stations before the commencement of counting. The serial numbers of the seals were verified in the presence of candidates' agents prior to opening the ballot boxes.

This procedure strengthened transparency and provided assurance that ballot boxes had not been tampered with during the voting phase.

The Count: Transparency Meets Fatigue

Flow (Transparency)

100%



100% of candidates' agents present signed the result declaration forms, indicating broad procedural acceptance at the station level.

Friction (Administrative Strain)

25%

25% of stations experienced procedural challenges. Sorting 9 separate ballots led to tabulation errors, requiring repeated counts and extending durations.

20%



20% of stations failed to publicly affix the result declaration forms on notice boards, a notable gap in public transparency.

Counting Process and Procedural Challenges

Ballot papers were sorted and counted in accordance with established procedures. However, minor procedural challenges were observed in 25% of the polling stations.

The reported issues primarily related to the time-consuming nature of counting multiple ballot papers across nine contested positions. In some instances, presiding officers made tabulation errors while reconciling cast ballots, necessitating repeated counts to correct discrepancies. These repetitions extended the duration of the counting process.

Additionally, isolated incidents of stray ballot papers being found in incorrect ballot boxes were reported. While these occurrences did not indicate systemic malpractice, they reflect the operational complexity of managing multiple ballot papers simultaneously and underscore the need for strengthened ballot management controls.

Despite these challenges, observers did not report deliberate manipulation or interference with the counting process.

Transparency and Agent Participation

All candidates' agents present during counting and results declaration signed the result declaration forms for all contested positions. This indicates broad acceptance of the recorded outcomes at the polling station level and reinforces procedural transparency.

The presence and participation of agents throughout counting contributed positively to accountability and reduced the likelihood of post-count disputes.

Public Display of Results

In 20% of observed polling stations, result declaration forms were not publicly affixed on the notice boards within the polling stations as required by law.

Public posting of results is an important transparency safeguard, enabling independent verification by candidates, observers, and voters. While the majority complied with this requirement, the instances of non-compliance represent a procedural gap that should be addressed to enhance public confidence and strengthen accountability.

Incident Analysis – Set-Up and Opening Phase

Overview

During the set-up and opening phase of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) Elections 2026, ELOG observers documented a limited number of incidents. All recorded cases were classified as Minor Incidents, as they were administrative or procedural in nature, resolved within a short duration, and did not disrupt the overall conduct of polling.

No major or critical incidents were reported during the observed opening phase. There were no cases involving violence, ballot shortages, station closures, or prolonged suspension of operations.

Incident Log: Administrative Hurdles

ZERO

Major Incidents. No violence, ballot shortages, or station closures.



Accreditation

Observer **initially denied access** at Kiambu/Nairobi Supreme Court due to un-synchronized accreditation lists. **Promptly resolved.**



Identification

Isolated attempts to vote using **driving licenses** instead of National IDs (Bungoma/Busia). **Rebuffed correctly** by officials.



Location

Voter assigned to Nairobi Branch presented at **Supreme Court station. Identified and redirected peacefully.**

1. Observer Access Challenges

Location(s): Kiambu Law Courts; Nairobi Supreme Court Polling Station

Classification: Minor Incident (Administrative - resolved promptly)

At the commencement of polling, one accredited ELOG observer was initially denied access to a polling station after their name did not appear on the accreditation list circulated to Presiding Officers. The observer was in possession of valid accreditation credentials and an official identification badge.

The omission on the station-level list resulted in temporary denial of entry. Following consultation between the observer, the Presiding Officer, and relevant election officials at both station and headquarters levels, the matter was clarified and resolved expeditiously. The observer was subsequently granted full access and was able to monitor the opening procedures without further impediment.

2. Voter Identification Irregularities

Location(s): West Kenya Branch - Bungoma (1 incident); Busia (2 incidents); Nairobi Supreme Court

Classification: Minor Incident (Procedural – no voting disruption)

Observers documented isolated cases where individuals presented themselves for voting without the prescribed identification documents. In one instance, a voter attempted to vote using a driving license rather than the required National Identification Card or Passport.

Polling officials enforced the identification requirements consistently and declined to issue ballot papers to individuals who did not meet the stipulated criteria. No evidence of unauthorized voting or procedural compromise was observed.

3. Voters Presenting at Incorrect Polling Stations

Location: Nairobi Supreme Court Law Courts

Classification: Minor Incident (Administrative)

An isolated case was observed where a voter presented at a polling station but was registered at a different voting location (Nairobi Branch). Upon verification, the voter was informed of the discrepancy and was not permitted to vote at that station.

The Presiding Officer handled the situation professionally and in accordance with established procedures. The matter did not cause disruption to polling operations.

Overall Assessment

All incidents recorded during the set-up and opening phase were minor in nature and were resolved promptly without escalation. They did not materially affect the commencement or conduct of voting.

While limited in scope, the documented cases provide constructive lessons for procedural refinement, particularly in accreditation management, voter communication, and administrative coordination. Addressing these areas would further strengthen operational uniformity and enhance institutional confidence in future LSK electoral processes.

CONCLUSION

The 2026 Law Society of Kenya (LSK) Elections marked an important milestone in the Society's governance cycle, conducted pursuant to the Law Society of Kenya Act and the LSK (General) Regulations, 2020. Beyond the election of office bearers for the 2026-2028 term, the process served as a practical test of institutional preparedness, procedural consistency, and internal democratic accountability within one of Kenya's most influential professional bodies.

Based on systematic observation across sampled polling stations and the tallying centre, ELOG finds that the 2026 LSK elections were conducted in a generally orderly, peaceful, and procedurally structured manner. The majority of polling stations adhered to prescribed guidelines governing opening, voting, closing, counting, and results declaration. Election officials demonstrated operational preparedness, and members were able to exercise their franchise without significant interference or intimidation.

The pre-election stakeholder engagements convened by the Elections Board contributed positively to clarity of roles, expectations, and operational procedures. This early coordination enhanced transparency and reduced uncertainty on Election Day.

Importantly, no major or critical incidents were recorded during the set-up, voting, counting, or tallying phases. The incidents documented were administrative and minor in nature. These included an accreditation list discrepancy affecting observer access at select polling stations, cases of voters presenting without prescribed identification documents, and isolated instances of voters reporting to polling stations where they were not registered. All were resolved promptly at polling station level, did not escalate into wider disruption, and did not materially compromise the integrity or continuity of the electoral process.

Institutional Strengths: Pillars of the 2026 Success



At the same time, the observation identified procedural inconsistencies that warrant institutional attention. Variations in documentation practices, instances of ballot secrecy vulnerabilities due to spatial constraints, tabulation errors during counting in some stations, and failure to publicly affix results forms in a minority of polling stations reflect areas where operational standardization can be strengthened. While these did not fundamentally undermine the credibility of the elections, they highlight the importance of uniform application of procedures across all locations.

The 2026 elections reaffirm the centrality of four institutional pillars: standardized training, clear written guidelines, harmonized accreditation systems, and strengthened results management protocols. Ensuring consistent enforcement of voter identification requirements, proper ballot reconciliation, transparent results declaration, and uniform posting of results remains critical to consolidating member confidence.

The generally peaceful conduct of the elections, coupled with full compliance on closing time rules and ballot seal verification, reflects positively on the administrative capacity of the LSK Elections Board 2026-2028 and the professionalism of polling officials. The active participation of candidates' agents during counting and signing of results declaration forms further strengthened transparency and acceptance at the polling station level.


Looking ahead, institutional learning between electoral cycles will be essential. Strengthening documentation practices, enhancing scenario-based training for Presiding Officers, improving accreditation verification systems, reinforcing ballot secrecy safeguards, and formalizing structured post-election reviews will consolidate gains achieved in 2026. Continuous improvement rather than episodic reform should guide future electoral planning.

In conclusion, ELOG assesses that the 2026 LSK Elections were largely credible, peaceful, and procedurally compliant, with minor administrative gaps that are correctable through targeted reforms. The elections demonstrate growing institutional maturity within the Society and provide a solid foundation upon which future electoral cycles can build.

Vulnerabilities to Address for 2028

Zone 1: Spatial Planning

Reliance on cramped court facilities creates systemic vulnerabilities for **ballot secrecy**.



Zone 3: Information Asymmetry

Instances of mismatched accreditation lists and voters showing up to the wrong stations point to gaps in **pre-election data sharing** and **voter education**.

Zone 2: Tallying Fatigue

The **manual reconciliation** of nine simultaneous ballot boxes overwhelms officials, leading to **arithmetic errors** and **delayed results**.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Drawing from the findings of the 2026 observation and lessons identified in previous electoral cycles, including 2024, ELOG proposes the following recommendations to enhance procedural uniformity, administrative efficiency, and institutional integrity in future Law Society of Kenya (LSK) elections conducted under the Law Society of Kenya Act and the LSK (General) Regulations, 2020.

These recommendations address both operational gaps observed in 2026 and systemic improvements necessary for long-term institutional strengthening. They are intended to support continuous improvement rather than corrective intervention alone.

1. Institutionalized and Mandatory Training Programme for Polling Officials


The Elections Board should design and implement a comprehensive, standardized, and mandatory training programme for all Presiding Officers, Deputy Presiding Officers, clerks, and tallying officials.

The programme should go beyond general orientation and focus specifically on:

- ◆ Accurate completion of standardized result declaration forms;
- ◆ Uniform ballot reconciliation procedures across all positions;
- ◆ Handling accreditation discrepancies, including observer access issues;
- ◆ Strict enforcement of voter identification requirements;
- ◆ Incident classification, documentation, and reporting protocols;
- ◆ Standard operating procedures for opening, voting, counting, and results transmission.

Training should be supported by detailed written manuals and practical simulation exercises to reduce interpretational inconsistencies across polling stations. Scenario-based training would particularly strengthen preparedness for administrative anomalies such as stray ballots, arithmetic errors, or accreditation disputes.

The 2028 Blueprint: Standardizing the Process



2. Clear, Standardized, and Consolidated Written Guidelines

The Elections Board should develop a consolidated and user-friendly operational handbook to be distributed well in advance of polling day. The handbook should clearly outline:

- ◆ Prescribed format and completion requirements for result declaration forms;
- ◆ Standard ballot reconciliation formulas;
- ◆ Observer accreditation handling procedures;
- ◆ Acceptable voter identification documents;
- ◆ Procedures for voters presenting at incorrect polling stations;
- ◆ Incident classification and reporting standards.

These guidelines should be available in both printed and digital formats and accessible at every polling station. Introducing a standardized Presiding Officer checklist would further promote procedural uniformity and reduce station-level variations.

3. Strengthened and Early Voter Education Initiatives

To minimize avoidable administrative incidents, the Society should implement structured and early voter education programmes.

This should include:

- ◆ Clear communication on acceptable identification documents;
- ◆ Early publication and confirmation of assigned polling stations;
- ◆ Direct member notifications through email and SMS;
- ◆ Utilization of branch-level communication structures and digital platforms.

Targeted and timely communication would significantly reduce cases of voters presenting without prescribed identification or reporting to incorrect polling stations, thereby enhancing operational efficiency on Election Day.

The 2028 Blueprint: Technology and Systems

Digital Voter Verification



Deploy **secure digital tools** or portable devices at stations to **instantly catch** wrong-station voters and **reduce administrative delays**.

Harmonized Accreditation



Transition to **QR-coded badges** and **centralized digital confirmation** systems to **prevent observer access delays**.

Standardized Tallying Formulas



Institutionalize **mandatory, digitally-backed cross-checking** procedures for results declaration forms **before transmission**.

“ Sustained institutional learning rather than episodic, reactive reform must guide future electoral planning. ”

4. Enhanced Voter Registration Verification Mechanisms

To address instances of voters presenting at incorrect polling stations, the Elections Board should strengthen voter verification systems at polling stations.

Possible measures include:

- ◆ Provision of clearly organized, certified printed registers by branch and polling station;
- ◆ Deployment of secure digital verification tools or portable verification devices;
- ◆ Establishment of a real-time centralized verification help desk at headquarters.

Improved verification mechanisms would reduce administrative delays, minimize disputes, and improve the overall voter experience.

5. Standardized and Transparent Tallying Procedures

To ensure arithmetic consistency and strengthen transparency, the Elections Board should institutionalize uniform tallying procedures across polling stations and the central tallying centre.

This should include:

- ◆ A prescribed reconciliation formula linking ballots issued, ballots cast, valid votes, rejected ballots, and candidate totals;
- ◆ Mandatory cross-checking and dual sign-off procedures prior to results transmission;
- ◆ Standardized formatting of results declaration forms;
- ◆ Immediate documentation and escalation of any discrepancies.

Strengthened tallying protocols would reduce arithmetic inconsistencies, enhance credibility, and mitigate potential post-election disputes.

6. Strengthening Accreditation and Observer Access Systems

To prevent recurrence of accreditation-related access challenges, the Elections Board should:

- ◆ Finalize and verify accreditation lists well in advance of polling day;
- ◆ Circulate certified observer lists to all Presiding Officers;
- ◆ Establish a rapid-response communication mechanism for accreditation clarification;
- ◆ Introduce digital verification tools such as QR-coded badges or centralized confirmation systems.

Clear and harmonized accreditation procedures will improve transparency and reduce avoidable administrative misunderstandings at polling stations.

7. Reinforcement of Voting Timelines and Operational Readiness

The Elections Board should reinforce strict adherence to official opening and closing times through:

- ◆ Clear advance communication of voting timelines;
- ◆ Mandatory early reporting of polling officials for set-up;
- ◆ Standardized opening and closing procedural checklists;
- ◆ Clear guidance on managing voters present at the official closing time.

Prompt commencement and orderly closure of polling strengthen credibility and enhance confidence in procedural fairness.

8. Institutionalized Post-Election Review Mechanism

The Society should formalize a structured post-election review process involving:

- ◆ Members of the Elections Board;
- ◆ Branch representatives;
- ◆ Polling officials;
- ◆ Accredited observers.

The review should assess operational performance, document lessons learned, identify procedural gaps, and inform amendments to future guidelines. Institutionalizing such a review would enhance institutional memory and support progressive refinement between electoral cycles.

Overall Recommendation

The 2026 LSK elections were largely peaceful, transparent, and procedurally sound, with only minor administrative incidents recorded. However, strengthening standardization, documentation, accreditation systems, training frameworks, tallying procedures, and voter communication mechanisms will further consolidate institutional credibility.

ELOG encourages the Law Society of Kenya to adopt these recommendations within a continuous improvement framework aimed at reinforcing electoral integrity, operational consistency, and member confidence in the Society's governance processes.

Sustained institutional learning rather than reactive reform should guide future electoral planning cycles.

ANNEXES


Establishing the Observation Mandate



1 Pre-Poll Setup & Verification

2 Active Polling & Voter Autonomy

3 Poll Closing & Reconciliation



Phase 1: Pre-Poll Setup

Initiating the Official Documentation Process

- Polling stations undergo a rigorous preparation phase.
- All electoral materials are thoroughly logged.
- Presiding officers verify documentation prior to the opening of the polls.




Phase 1: Pre-Poll Setup

Securing the Chain of Custody

Transparent boxes ensure absolute visibility and eliminate the possibility of pre-stuffed ballots existing before the polls open.

Serialized, color-coded seals guarantee the physical integrity of the box throughout the entirety of the voting process.



Phase 1: Pre-Poll Setup

Rigorous Documentation of Box and Seal Serial Numbers

2.3. RECORD OF SERIAL NUMBERS OF BALLOT BOXES AND SEALS USED
 BY ELECTION OFFICIALS (ELECTION OFFICERS)
 It is the duty of the election officials to ensure that each ballot box is sealed with the serial numbers of the ballot boxes and seals used to seal each ballot box at the time of polling. It is the duty of the election officials to ensure that the serial numbers of the ballot boxes and seals used to seal the ballot boxes at the end of polling.

TYPE OF ELECTION	BALLOT BOX SERIAL NUMBER	EBC BALLOT BOX SEALS
LSK President	136647	0775690
LSK Vice President	342782	0775689
LSK Council Member - General Member of over 25 years	440546	0775688
LSK Council Member - General Member	397077	0775687
LSK Council (Up-County) Representative	03485	0775686
LSK Council Member - Coast Representatives	440577	0775685
LSK Council Member - Coast Representatives	263534	0775684
Advocate Disciplinary Tribunal	282165	0775683

I, DAVID K. CHERRY (Name of Presiding Officer)
 ID: 1267621 certify that the Serial Numbers as recorded above are the serial numbers of the ballot boxes and EBC seals used to seal the ballot boxes at the end of polling.


David K. Cherry
 Signature of Presiding Officer

I.E.B.C. PRESIDING OFFICER

ELECTION CATEGORY	BOX NUMBER	SEAL NUMBER
LSK President	136647	0725690
LSK Vice President	342782	0775689
Coast Representative	263534	0775684
Disciplinary Tribunal	282165	0775683

Phase 1: Pre-Poll Setup

Station Readiness and Structural Transparency



Phase 2: Active Polling

Order and Process Control During Active Voting




The flow of movement is strictly managed to prevent overcrowding. Each voter is fully verified by clerks and issued all necessary ballot papers in a controlled sequence before moving to the private marking booth.

Phase 2: Active Polling

Guaranteeing Absolute Voter Secrecy

Despite the open layout of the observation floor, the physical act of marking the ballot is shielded entirely from officials, observers, and other voters. The enclosed booth ensures the fundamental right to a secret ballot.



Phase 2: Active Polling

Unobstructed Casting of the Ballot



Voters deposit their marked ballots directly into the respective candidate boxes without interference. This unbroken action ensures a direct, verifiable link between voter intent and the physical record.


Phase 3: Poll Closing Procedures

Immediate Securing of the Ballots at Poll Close

At the exact moment the polls close, the environment shifts immediately from active voting to strict evidence preservation.



Capturing digital timestamped evidence of the box seals upon the close of voting.



Phase 3: Poll Closing Procedures

Final Serial Number Reconciliation




This critical step ensures the serial numbers of the seals match the exact records taken at dawn, definitively proving no box was replaced or tampered with throughout the day.

Phase 3: Poll Closing Procedures

Orderly Preparation for the Tallying Phase




Multiple officials collaboratively cross-check the station's administrative documentation, ensuring an organized transition from public voting to tallying before a single box is opened.




Phase 3: Poll Closing Procedures

Official Certification of the Completed Poll



The multi-party agent signatures provide mutual, legally binding the closing procedures were visible, fair, and strictly adhered to protocol.

An Unbroken Chain of Integrity



- **Verified Setup:** Serialized tracking and transparent materials ensured a sterile environment prior to voting.
- **Protected Autonomy:** Strict station layout and enclosed booths guaranteed an orderly, secret ballot.
- **Certified Closure:** Multi-agent verification and digital reconciliation secured the votes prior to tallying.

The visual and documentary evidence of the 2026 LSK Elections confirms rigorous compliance with electoral integrity protocols.



Elections Observation Group

CREDIBLE, PEACEFUL, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS



INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN DEMOCRACY

"Knowledge for Democracy"



Centre for Minority Rights Development



TRANSFORM EMPOWERMENT FOR ACTION INITIATIVE (TEAM)



Legal Resources Foundation Trust