



# **IN THEIR OWN VOICES**

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**CITIZENS' INDEPENDENT AUDIT ON THE  
QUALITY OF THE 2017 REGISTER OF VOTERS**



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### **OUR VISION:**

Credible, Peaceful, Free and Fair Electoral Processes in Kenya and the African Region

### **MISSION:**

To Promote Democracy by Providing a Platform for Monitoring and Observing the Electoral Processes.

### **OUR CORE VALUES**

**Integrity:** We shall be Transparent, Objective and Accountable to Ourselves and the Public.

**Impartiality:** We shall Discharge Our Mandate in a Non-Partisan manner.

**Inclusivity:** We shall at All Times Endeavour to Uphold the Diversity of All.

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<b>CoK</b>	Constitution of Kenya, 2010
<b>CRS</b>	Civil Registration Services
<b>CSOs</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DIS</b>	Department of Immigration Services
<b>ELOG</b>	Elections Observation Group
<b>FBOs</b>	Faith Based Organizations
<b>IEBC</b>	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
<b>IED</b>	Institute for Education in Democracy
<b>JSPC</b>	Joint Select Parliamentary Committee
<b>KDA</b>	Kenya Diaspora Alliance
<b>KIEMS</b>	Kenya Integrated Elections Management System
<b>KNBS</b>	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
<b>KPMG</b>	Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>NRB</b>	National Registration Bureau
<b>NVRR</b>	National Voter Registration Rate
<b>OMR</b>	Optical Mark Reader
<b>PVT</b>	Parallel Vote Tabulation
<b>RoV</b>	Register of Voters
<b>VLA</b>	Voters' List Assessment

## **Acknowledgements**

The Elections Observation Group (ELOG) is greatly indebted to the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) through the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) for the financial support that made the assessment of the 2017 Register of voters possible.

We are grateful to the ELOG Steering Committee for its strategic leadership under the Chairperson, Regina Opondo (CRECO). We acknowledge and thank Susan Mwongera (Youth Agenda), Susie Ibutu (NCCK), Beatrice Odera (CJPC), Teresa Omondi (FIDA), Anderson Gitonga (UDPK), Ven. Jephthah Gathaka (ECJP), Kennedy Masime (CGD), Lattif Shaban (SUPKEM), and Joyce Majiwa (IED).

We profoundly thank the Voters' List Assessment (VLA) Trainer of Trainers for conducting high-level trainings of field personnel. The standardized trainings ensured acquisition of adequate and relevant skills to conduct VLA field test. We thank the VLA interviewers, Supervisors and Spot Checkers who worked tirelessly to ensure that VLA survey protocols were adhered to and that the VLA data was of high quality.

We extend our immense gratitude and appreciation to the ELOG Secretariat under the leadership of the National Coordinator, Mulle Musau for the overall planning and management of the VLA exercise. We also thank the data entry clerks for the verification of the VLA field data.

We greatly appreciate and thank the two consultants; Mrs. Elizabeth Kirema and Joseph Irura for the professionalism and high technical support in undertaking logical computer tests analysis of the register, development of VLA training materials, coordination and facilitation of trainings, data capture, analysis and compilation of this report. We also acknowledge and appreciate Michael Njuki Mwarange for drawing the VLA sample.

We acknowledge and thank the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) for the cooperation and provision of the soft copy of the 2017 register of voters in readable formats that enabled ELOG to undertake the logical computer analysis and draw a representative sample for the people -to - list field survey.

Finally, we thank all the respondents who agreed to be interviewed during the VLA exercise and for providing information that is vital in the improvement of voter registration in Kenya.

**Regina Opondo,**  
**ELOG Steering Committee**

## Foreword

To quote the former Chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Ahmed Isaack Hassan, *'the integrity of an election is based on how well all the composite parts of the electoral cycle are undertaken'*. In this regard voter registration remains a core component of the electoral cycle and when well conducted contributes to the overall credibility of an electoral process through the production of an accurate voter register from which the respective country's voters are drawn and verified from.

Such a strategic process is therefore required to be above board and beyond reproach and it is no wonder that a raft of laws articulately stipulated in every country to ensure that an elaborate framework is set to guide the process. In Kenya this legal framework is provided by the Elections Act and other subsidiary legislations. To further strengthen this and bestow confidence in the process, the Act in Section 8A provides that the Commission may engage a professional firm to undertake an audit for the register at least six months before a general election. It is however important to note that the tone of the stipulation does not bind the commission to such an undertaking.

Voter registration process is a continuous process in Kenya that goes on throughout the electoral cycle only stopping immediately before and after a General Election. This means that the register undergoes a series of updating and verifications by the time a complete register is drawn. In the run up to the 2017 Elections, apart from the continuous process, the Commission initiated mass registration campaigns to enlist and reach out to as many voters as possible. These campaigns were critical in attaining the historic 19.6 million strong voter roll that was used in the General Elections.

Since the 2013 electoral process, the election management body has employed the use of technological tools to both register (Biometric Registration) and identify (Voter Identification Devices) voters in the register. This is part of the EMBs initiate to improve the efficiency of the process as well as enhance transparency. This has however not necessarily led to the increased confidence of the public on the integrity of the register.

Following the politically instigated removal of former commissioners from the IEBC and the subsequent amendments to a number of targeted electoral laws in September 2016, IEBC was legally required to conduct an audit of the voter register then before the 2017 elections. While this was done and a report generated albeit in an arguably public - insulated formal process, many stakeholders felt that there was still a need for an independent audit of the register.

As a citizen platform, ELOG applied to conduct another audit with the purposed outcome of identifying any inaccuracies that could be addressed before the elections. This did not materialize as anticipated as the register was shared too late in the day to undertake meaningful changes to the register.

Nevertheless, and despite the above, ELOG was able to conduct both a people-to list survey where random samples of voters were interviewed to ascertain their details *in or not in* the register, and computer logical tests that were applied on the official electronic register to compute any errors and inconsistencies on the data provided. It is instructive to note that after the 2013 General Elections, ELOG through one of its member organizations, The Institute for Education In Democracy (IED), conducted another independent audit of the then register whose report was widely used to appraise the voter's roll.

In this report ELOG outlines the findings of this assessment and makes critical recommendations on enhancing the accuracy and completeness of the voter register moving forward. We believe that that findings shared in this report will be useful to different stakeholders including the IEBC as we all strive to ensure that the integrity of all the electoral processes is guaranteed.

**Mulle Musau**  
**National Coordinator, ELOG**

## Executive Summary

The right of all adult citizens to participate in the affairs of their government is one of the Cornerstones of democracy. International and regional instruments on human rights as well as National Constitutions acknowledge that the most fundamental form of citizen participation in political processes is the right to vote in credible, free and fair elections. Article one of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides that sovereign power belongs to the people of Kenya, which can be exercised directly or indirectly through democratically elected representatives. In addition Article 38 provides for political rights, which includes the right to make political choices, and the right to free, fair and regular elections based on universal suffrage and the free expression of the will of the voters. One of the key component of exercising the sovereign power and the realization of political rights provided in the Constitution is the existence of a comprehensive, accurate and up to date Register of Voters (RoV), which is rigorously maintained to ensure, as much as possible, that each eligible citizen is registered to vote once and only once in a single election or referendum.

A credible register of voters is a key contribution to the legitimacy of elections and the new government that is ushered to office. Over the years, there have been pertinent concerns that have persistently been raised regarding the integrity of the RoV. These are; inclusion of names of ineligible individuals - non-existent names (Ghost Voters), underage voters and foreigners; double / multiple registration, exclusion of names of eligible individuals, inclusion of names of eligible individuals with mistakes, errors or out of date information, under registration of specific demographic (i.e. women, youth and PWDs) and marginalization of various areas / regions. Various stakeholders raised these concerns, which informed part of the reasons for the amendment of Elections Act 2011, to provide for an independent professional body to audit the 2017 register of voters.

It is against this backdrop that ELOG assessed the quality of the Register of Voters (RoV) that was used on 8<sup>th</sup> August 2017 general elections. The assessment aimed to achieve the following objectives:

- To ascertain the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of the 2017 Register of Voters (RoV)
- To establish reasons for lack of registration of approximately 5.6<sup>1</sup> million

eligible voters as reported by the KPMG RoV audit report

- To compare the quality of the RoV that was used on 4<sup>th</sup> March 2013 general elections with the 2017 RoV
- To make recommendations that would improve voter registration processes, compilation and maintenance of a credible RoV for future elections and referenda in Kenya.

The assessment employed two methodologies namely; computer tests and statistically rigorous one - way field test (People-to- List). Computer tests involved undertaking a series of logical tests to analyze an electronic copy of the 2017 RoV to determine the degree of errors and registration rates and trends for various demographic groups. It involved undertaking internal consistency tests and external consistency tests. Internal consistency tests examined issues such as duplicates records, under age voters, records with missing information and inaccurate records. External consistency tests compared variables such as gender breakdowns, registration rates for youth, regional distribution and other details to external baseline data such as the voting age in 2017, Number of ID card issued by the National Registration Bureau (NRB) and Number of passports issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The computer analysis analyzed 19,611,423 records contained in the register dated 28<sup>th</sup> June 2017 that was shared with ELOG.

The People-to- List field survey sought to determine whether there were people who were eligible to vote and who appeared to have attempted to register, but whose names and other details were absent from the RoV. This methodology utilized a representative sample of 2,280 respondents drawn from the 47 counties. The survey was conducted with a 95% confidence level and a margin of error of +/- 2% .

## **KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION RATE (NVRR)**

The VLA found out that the National Voter Registration Rate (NVRR)<sup>2</sup> during the 2017 general elections ranged from 77% to 78%. This was 10% increase from the 2013 general elections where the NVRR was 68%. This is an indication that majority of Kenyans are aware of their sovereign power as provided in Article

<sup>1</sup> KPMG Independent Audit of 2017 RoV, P.21

<sup>2</sup> This is the percentage of approximate population aged 18 years and above who actually registered and their details are in the RoV

one of the Constitution as well as their political rights provided in Article 38. These findings correspond with that in the KPMG audit report that found out that the NVRR was 77.93%. ELOG commends IEBC for its efforts to reach out to majority of eligible voters and ensuring that they have been enlisted. The VLA also revealed that about 22% to 23% of eligible and qualified citizens did not register as voters. This can be attributed to voter apathy, failure of leaders to fulfill their campaign promises or unsatisfactory performance of the elected leaders.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) To realize 100% National Voter Registration Rate, the Constitution needs to be amended either to provide for the integration of civil and voter registration processes or to provide for mandatory voter registration for all eligible voters.
- b) Just like voter registration is continuous, IEBC should strengthen its partnership with the relevant stakeholders to provide targeted continuous voter education to citizens. It is believed that effective voter education can help address the issue of voter apathy among eligible voters
- c) That the national treasury through the parliament should provide timely and adequate finances to facilitate the implementation of continuous civic/voter education within the entire electoral cycle both within and outside the country.
- d) Completion of the integration of Voter Education to the new education curriculum of 2-6-6-3
- e) The elected leaders should implement their campaign manifesto and ensure high-level performance as leaders. This will act as a motivational factor to citizens to participate in political processes.

## **2. PROGRESSIVE DIASPORA VOTER REGISTRATION COVERAGE**

As much as Article 82 (1)(e) of the Constitution of Kenya (CoK), 2010 provides for progressive registration and realization of voting rights for citizens residing outside Kenya, that progression is too slow resulting in a coverage of 0.2% for the last seven years since the promulgation of the Constitution. It is approximated that 10% of eligible voters reside outside Kenya. When computed against the National eligible voters of 25,215,055 the indication is that there were approximately 2,521,506

eligible citizens in the diaspora for the 2017 general elections. IEBC managed to register only 4,393 in five countries thus Tanzania (1,377), Uganda (1,184), Rwanda (875), South Africa (783) and Burundi 164. Despite that fact there was an increase of 40% of diaspora registration in 2017 (from 2,637 in 2013 to 4,393), ELOG is of the view that the coverage can be enhanced if there is a strategic focus on franchising Kenyans in the Diaspora.

ELOG VLA noted a number of factors that impact on the efforts to enhance voting rights of citizens outside the country. These include lack of political good will, non-registration of Kenyans with Embassies / High Commission or consulates in the host countries, lack of official census data on citizens in the diaspora, lack of diaspora representation in parliament, different country time zones, inadequate voter education for diaspora, logistical and operational challenges, inadequate financial resources, legal requirement that one has to vote in person, lack of an international policy to guide the coordination of electoral activities in host countries and inadequate policy /law on diaspora voter registration and voting.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) That there is need to have diaspora representation in the parliament. Perhaps the 2019 boundary delimitation process should consider create a constituency for the diaspora. This will ensure that the diaspora voting right issue is often put on the agenda for deliberations and decision-making in parliament.
- b) Just as it was recommended by IED in its 2013 Audit report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) should work together and ensure that a Housing and Population Census for citizens in the diaspora in August 2019 when the country population census will be conducted. The data will inform logistical planning and development of diaspora registration and voting policy
- c) Since many citizens in the diaspora do not register with the Embassies / High Commissions or consulates of the countries they reside for various reasons, ELOG recommends that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KNBS establish and maintain a structured engagement with diaspora non-state actors that have diaspora data to support diaspora Census initiative.
- d) Review of the Diaspora policy to ensure that it takes into cognizance the context in which citizens in the diaspora operates to inform the diaspora

voter registration and voting procedures. The policy should consider among others the criteria for country selection where the Commission would like to franchise voters first, voter registration process such as use of online registration system, voting procedures such as voting by proxy, voting via post, voting via Internet and advance voting. Advance voting would address the issues of time zone differences. Review of the diaspora policy should adopt a participatory and consultative approach to ensure all stakeholders are effectively engaged.

- e) Once diaspora census data is available, IEBC should use the data to inform the establishment of temporary / mobile polling centres where there are high concentrations of the Diaspora in the respective countries
- f) IEBC to strengthen collaboration with electoral stakeholders particularly the Civil Society to develop effective and efficient online platforms for diaspora voter education.

### 3. COMPARISON OF MALE AND FEMALE REGISTRATION RATES

Out of the 25, 215,055 eligible voters in 2017 as provided by Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), 51% accounting for 12,859,678 were female while 49% accounting for 12,355,377 were male. This means female eligible voters were more than male eligible voters by 2% (501,301). Despite this fact, more male were registered than female. IEBC registered 9,925,296 (50.61%) male compared to 9,686,127 (49.39% female). These statistics indicates under registration of women eligible voters. This finding corresponds with KPMG finding that showed underrepresentation of women when comparisons are made between the to KNBS and NRB population ratio. This trend for women under registration has been noted in 2010 and 2013 RoV audits.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) The IEBC institutionalizes community sensitization in their voter education strategies to reach out to men voters and other stakeholders with an aim of influencing them to change their attitude towards women participation in political processes. This will ensure that men support women in their desire to participate in electoral processes either as a voter or as a candidate
- b) IEBC to strengthen its partnership with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) and other organizations to implement targeted voter education for women.

- c) IEBC to use motivational and social platforms such as twitter, Facebook, Instagram and infotainment strategies to reach out to young women voters with voter education messages.
- d) Political parties to ensure that the 30% of the Political Parties Fund support women political participation.

#### 4. COUNTIES WITH MORE REGISTERED WOMEN THAN MEN

Out the 47 counties, 21 Counties recorded higher registration of women than men. The first five in this list are: Turkana County where 57.5% of registered voters were women, Samburu County with 54.4% registered women, Siaya with 54.0% registered women, Homa Bay with 53.5% registered women and Kilifi with 52.8% registered women. Most of these counties are in rural areas.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a. Further research should be undertaken in these counties to establish strategies that were used to reach out to majority of women in these counties. Results from the research should provide learning experiences and best practices to be emulated in other counties.

#### 5. YOUTH REGISTRATION STATISTICS

Youth eligible voters constitute 45.55% of 25,215,055. This percentage accounts for 11,485,458 youth. Out of 11,485,458 eligible youth 9,530,239 youth were registered accounting for 83% National registration rate for the youth in 2017. This was a tremendous increase from 57% in 2013. With regard to the ratio of youth to non-youth, youth constituted 9,530,239 (48.60%) of the total 19,611,423 voters in the register. This was an increase of 0.6% of registered youth compared to 2013.

With regard to the ratio of youth to non-youth, VLA analysis showed that there were 16 counties where youth registration was more than Non-youth. The top seven counties that recorded highest number of youth registration are Mandera (59%), Nairobi City (57%) and Garissa (55 %), Wajir (55%), Kisumu (54%), Mombasa (54%) and Kajiado (54%). While those that recorded the lowest youth registration were Vihiga (40%), Kirinyaga (39%), Nyeri (39%), Makueni (39%) and Muranga (38%).

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) IEBC to strengthen its collaboration with the relevant stakeholders to

implement youth friendly outreach strategies such as use of interactive online tools such as Facebook, twitter, blogs, use of infotainment and edutainment voter education strategies

- b) The IEBC to enhance the engagement of youth as election officials not only as clerks but also as presiding officers and deputy presiding officers.
- c) The elections observers to enhance the engagement of the youth as election observers
- d) Political parties to adhere to the Youth Affirmative Action to ensure enough youth are nominated to vie for various elective positions and adherence to the law to nominate youth through the party list system.
- e) That the IEBC enhances the strategy to establish registration centres in institutions of learning such as universities and Colleges to reach out to more youth
- f) NRB should also come up with strategies of ensuring that those coming age are adequately facilitated to acquire ID cards. NRB should also establish mechanism of notifying those who have applied for the ID card when the cards are ready for collection. NRB should also review the documents required to ID acquisition to ensure that children born out of wedlock, children raised by single parent, orphans and those whose parents are divorced have the opportunity to acquire ID cards.

## **6. REGISTRATION STATISTICS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (PWDs)**

According to KPMG report, PWD constitutes 3.5% of the total population<sup>3</sup>. This means there are about 1,612,404 persons with disability in the entire population. Just like with the deceased voters ELOG was not able to determine the registration rates for persons with disability neither was it able to determine the ratio of persons with the disabilities in the 2017 RoV. The absence of an official register of persons with disabilities from National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPD) with unique identifier such as ID card number made it impossible for ELOG to determine registration rates for persons with disabilities. On the hand, it was impossible to analyze the ratio of persons with disabilities in the 2017 RoV since there is no tag or any identification mark.

<sup>3</sup> Refer to KPMG report. P. 180

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) That the National Council for Persons with Disabilities liaises with KNBS to conduct census for PWDs in August 2019. The official data captured during the 2019 Population and Housing Census exercise will be crucial in the planning and informing strategies to enhance the participation of PWDs in the electoral processes.
- b) The IEBC should ensure that all registration centres are accessible to PWDs
- c) IEBC should ensure that voter education training materials and content delivery strategies are PWD Friendly
- d) PWDs should be engaged as election monitors and observers, IEBC elections officials and candidates.
- e) The IEBC should share disaggregated Data on PWDs as captured during voter registration to enable accurate analysis of their participation in the electoral process

## 7. REGISTRATION STATUS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Out of the 2,280 respondents interviewed, 2,150 (94%) indicated that they were registered while 130 (6%) indicated that they were not. The statistics revealed that the main reason why majority of the 6% of the respondents were not registered was due to Lack of National Identity card or passport accounting for 56%, followed by lack of interest (12%) and being sick during the time of registration accounting for 10%

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) That the National Registration Bureau simplifies and shortens the time for acquisition of ID cards
- b) IEBC implements targeted and continuous Voter education
- c) IEBC to strengthen the voter registration strategies in hospitals

## 8. PLACE FOR REGISTRATION

Majority of the respondents accounting for 96% indicated that they registered at the registration centre, 3% registered at their homes, while 1% registered at their places of worship such as a church or a mosque.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) That the IEBC ensures that registration centres are accessible to all eligible voters and especially the persons with disability
- b) There should be a clear plan for BVR kit movement within the constituencies, wards churches and mosques to ensure majority of the eligible voters are facilitated to register
- c) There should be enough BVR kits and registration officers to avoid long queues during registration.

## 9. DOCUMENT USED FOR REGISTRATION

Out of the 2,150 respondents who indicated that they were registered majority 2,129 (99%) used National Identity card to register while only 13 (0.6%) used passport despite having 1,291,576<sup>4</sup> Kenyans having passports as at 13th April 2017. These findings correspond with the IED's 2013 audit report which revealed that 99% of eligible Kenyans used the National Identification Card to register compared to only 0.8% who used a passport<sup>5</sup>. ELOG noted that the regulations are silent on the issue of expired passport as identification document during voting.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) That the Elections Act, 2011 and the Elections (General) Regulations 2011 be amended to clearly provide that one cannot vote using an expired passport.
- b) The Ministry of Immigration to consider having the same Passport number once one has renewed his/her passport. This will facilitate the process of identifying a voter during voting.
- c) The elections technology should be configured to detect passport expiry date during voter identification process.
- d) NRB to strengthen issuance of ID cards to high schools students who have attained the age 18 years before they leave school.

<sup>4</sup> See KPMG Report

<sup>5</sup> Refer to IED 2013 audit report, p. 26

## 10. INSPECTION OF THE REGISTER OF VOTERS

Section 6A of the Elections laws Amendment Act, 2016 requires that the IEBC opens the Register of voters for verification of biometric data by the members of the public at their respective polling stations for a period of 30 days. The IEBC opened the register for inspection from May 09<sup>th</sup> to June 09<sup>th</sup> 2017. Analysis showed that 75% of the respondents in the People – to- List test turned up for the inspection exercise while 25% did not. These statistics reveals a slight decline of 3% of voters who inspected their details in 2017 compared to those who inspected in 2013. The percentage of those that inspected the register in 2013 was 78%.

Among the voters who verified their details, 85% visited their registered polling Centres where the voters' roll was availed. 13% used the IEBC's SMS Platform while 1% used the IEBC's portal in the website. Comparing with 2013, 88.3% of voters visited the polling centres to verify their details as opposed to 85% in 2017. This is an indication of 3.3% decrease. On the other hand, voters utilizing the IEBC SMS platform in 2017 increased from 9.4% in 2013 to 13% in 2017. There was also an increase of voters who unitized the IEBC's website portal from 0.4% in 2013 to 1% in 2017.

Among the respondents who verified their details, only 8% made amendments. The changes were mainly on their names, the ID /Passport number, the gender and a few cases of the polling centre being wrongly captured. Majority of voters accounting for 49% did not inspect the register since they believed that they were automatically in the voters' register (49%) while 15% said that they were not aware of the verification exercise and 15% indicated that they were busy/ away from home.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) IEBC should continue availing the voters register at the polling centres since majority of voters prefer visiting these centres to verify their details
- b) Voter education on the importance of inspecting the RoV and all other means that are available for inspection such SMS and online platforms should be enhanced.
- c) IEBC should come up with a feedback strategy of informing voters on whether the claims they make during inspection of RoV have been addressed or not.

## 11. MAIN SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON VOTER REGISTRATION

An analysis of the effectiveness of various channels to disseminate voter education messages revealed that majority of the respondents rated the broadcast media as the most effective channel. Broadcast media, which included radio and TV, was cited by 49% of the respondents. These findings correspond with those of 2013 RoV audit that revealed that 41.6% of the respondents cited radio being the most effective channel for dissemination of Voter education<sup>6</sup>. The broadcast media was followed by religious institutions that were rated at 12%, IEBC Voter educators (9%), social Media (9%), chiefs/sub chiefs (7%), political parties (4%), print media (3%) and the least were from NGOs/CBOs (1%). From the statistics it appears that state and non-state actors need to assess the effectiveness of the voter education strategies they employ to ensure that their impact in providing voter education is felt by voters especially at the grass root level. These findings closely correspond with the 2013 audit findings.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on these finding ELOG recommends as follows:

- a) IEBC should continue and strengthen the use of local FM radios and TV to disseminate voter education messages. The Commission should also enhance the use of social media platform to reach out to the young voters and Kenyans in the diaspora.
- b) The NGOs/CBOs should strengthen their Voter Education strategies at the grass root level and more particularly work with the Community Based Organizations (CBO)

## 12. ANALYSIS OF ERRORS IN 2017 ROV

The analysis of 19,611,423 records in the register revealed that a number of records in the register had errors ranging from data formatting, mistakes in the number of characters in the National Identity Card and Passport Number, use of zero instead of letter 'O' and vice versa, wrong age, records with same identification number and incomplete records. ELOG noted that most of these errors are clerical errors that are mainly introduced during data capture. The following is a list of errors that were found in the 2017 RoV.

1. There were 23,440 records that had data shifted due to presence of commas in the variables. Most of the data that was truncated was found

<sup>6</sup> Refer to IED 2013 Audit report, p. 12

to be in the polling station variable and the Primary and Secondary names variables.

2. There was one record missing the ID or Passport Number
3. There were 2,186 records with clerical mistakes in the ID or passport numbers. E.g. use of letters instead of numbers or use of letter 'O' instead of zero
4. With regard to the length of the passport or ID numbers the lengths ranged between 2 and 15 with majority ranging between 7 and 8 characters.
5. There were 1, 618 records that contained alphabet characters preceded by numeric characters.
6. There were 568 records where the ID/Passport fields contained names (Letters Only) and not Numeric ID Numbers or the Alpha Numeric Passports.
7. The minimum year value was 1074, which is an error indicating that the oldest person in the register is 943 years old while the Maximum Year was 1999 indicating that the youngest person was 18 Years old as at the Last day of Registration of Voters.
8. There were 1,333 records whose year of birth fell in the range of between 1800 and 1899.
9. There was no standard way of recording names in the primary and secondary names columns. There were records that had more than one name in the primary name column while others only had one name in the secondary name column.
10. With regard to missing secondary names ELOG noted that out of the 19,611,423 records there were 57 records missing secondary names.
11. There were 4,734 records that had numeric characters in the primary Name Field.
12. There were 11,388 records that had numeric characters in the secondary name field. Most of these records had the Character Zero "0" instead of the letter "O".

13. When the variable containing ID/ Passport Numbers was analyzed ELOG found out that there were a total 169,646 duplicate records in the 2017 RoV. This finding closely corresponds with KPMG findings of 197,677 duplicated records.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** Based on the clerical errors in the 2017 RoV, ELOG recommends as follows.

- a) The Commission in collaboration with NRB and MFA investigates all the records that have wrong ID or passport format to establish their authenticity.
- b) The Commission builds a mechanism for comparative analysis of National Identification or Passport numbers captured by BVR Kit during voter registration process with those held by NRB and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).
- c) The Commission builds in a BVR data capture system that can detect errors during data capture. For example, if a voter registration clerk types in a name in the column of ID/Passport number, the BVR data capture system should be able to detect this. The system should also be able to detect double/ multiple registrations at the data capture stage.

### 13. RECORDS OF DEAD VOTERS IN THE 2017 ROV

ELOG was not able to determine the number of deceased voters in the register since there was no official list of dead voters that was provided by the Registrar of Births and Deaths. However, ELOG would like to concur with the KPMG findings and recommendations that the removal of deceased voters from the register presents the biggest challenge to the Commission. This is because there is no central electronic list of the number of deceased voters in the country kept by the registrar of births and deaths. Even if such a register is available it is not accurate since in many instances the records lack ID or passport numbers of the deceased person and includes details of the person reporting the death case<sup>7</sup>. In addition, most of the death cases are never reported and documented. Also, there are incomplete details of deceased person in the list of deceased voters such lack of ID card or passport number and lack of Date of birth that would be used to identify deceased voters in the register hence making it very difficult to remove the deceased voters from the register. KPMG report concluded that there could

be 1,037,260 deceased persons in the 2017 RoV and that the process of removing dead voters in the register is ineffective.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** In light of this ELOG recommends the following:

- a) That all state departments with data and information that is pertinent to voter registration and compilation of an accurate register should be compelled to share the data with the Commission to support the actualization of Article 35 of the Constitution<sup>8</sup> that provide that every citizen has the right of access to information held by the state or any person that is required for the protection of right or fundamental freedom.
- b) The registrar of birth and deaths to strengthen the registration process and ensure that an accurate and up to date list of deaths and births are available. This should be availed online for the public to verify and give feedback on its accuracy.
- c) IEBC to continue and enhance the use of biometrics to identify voters during voting.
- d) IEBC in collaboration with all electoral actors to develop a removal of dead voters from the RoV Policy to guide the process of cleaning the register.
- e) The Commission should consider nullification of the entire Register of Voters after two electoral cycles. This to some extent will reduce the number of deceased voters in the Register.

<sup>7</sup> Refer KPMG Report. p. 38

<sup>8</sup> Refer to Article 35 (b) of the Constitution

# CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Background to the Assessment of the 2017 Register of Voters

Voter registration is a process through which persons eligible to vote, register or enroll on a register of voters as a prerequisite for voting on elections or referenda. Such registration can be automatic where voter registration process is linked to civil registration or may require application to be made by an eligible voter. Voter registration process can also be mandatory or optional; periodic or continuous. The rules governing Voter registration vary among various Jurisdictions.

The participation of citizens in a credible free, fair and inclusive election has been regarded as a hallmark of a strong democracy. International and regional instruments on human rights as well as National Constitutions acknowledge that the most fundamental form of citizen participation in political processes is the right to vote in credible, free and fair elections. The ability to exercise the democratic right to vote is premised on the existence of a comprehensive, accurate and up to date Register of Voters (RoV), which is rigorously maintained to ensure, as much as possible, that each eligible citizen is registered to vote once and only once in a single election or referendum.

Two important principles underlie effective voter registration and maintenance of an accurate register. First, the system chosen for voter registration should facilitate the inclusion of all eligible voters. Democratic governance requires the existence of free and fair elections conducted amongst a broadly enfranchised electorate. In order to realize this principle, then, all (or substantially all) eligible electors should be included in the voters list. Their inclusion affirms their right to vote in the election. Second, voter registration should prevent exclusion of eligible citizens in the register.

Voter registration processes worldwide should meet international standards of universal suffrage<sup>9</sup> and equal suffrage<sup>10</sup>. A number of key strategies are employed to enhance the realization of universal suffrage during voter registration. These include: ensuring that effective measures are put in place to enable all persons entitled to vote to exercise their voting rights on Elections Day, ensuring that

<sup>9</sup> The right to vote of all adults, subject to minor exceptions

<sup>10</sup> The guarantee that each voter should have one vote and that only votes cast by eligible voters should be counted

voter registration is adequately facilitated and obstacles to such registration are adequately addressed, ensuring that no fees, taxes or other costs are incurred by citizens in order for them to register as voters, availability and adherence to the legal framework on voter registration, creating awareness and adherence to voter registration timetable, ensuring effective continuous voter registration or updates to allow for newly eligible voters to be included and deceased persons to be removed, mounting of effective voter education targeting especially first time voters, women and the minority groups and ensuring that the method of registration is simple and accessible.

Voters' List Assessment (VLA) is one of the statistical election observation methodology, the other being PVT (Parallel Vote Tabulation). It is a systematic, scientific, and independent assessment of the quality of RoV to determine its comprehensiveness, accuracy and timeliness. Voters' List Assessment is not a new phenomenon in Kenya. The Institute for education in Democracy (IED); a Steering Committee member of the Elections Observation Group (ELOG) has since 2002 undertaken independent Assessments of the RoV with the latest assessment report being that of 2013 general elections register. The institute launched a report titled '*Beyond Digital: A Report on the quality of the principal register of voters used on 4<sup>th</sup> March 2013 general elections*'. The report has salient recommendations to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), National Registration Bureau (NRB), Registrar of Births and Deaths, National Bureau of Statistics, Media, Political Parties, Civil Society and Faith Based Organizations. Some of the recommendations in this report mirror the KPMG report recommendations rising concerns on the seriousness with which the Commission implements recommendations emanating from RoV assessments. VLA has been undertaken in other countries such as Cambodia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

The VLAs are undertaken to response to concerns about the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of the voters' register. These concerns include inclusion of names of ineligible individuals - non-existent names (Ghost Voters), underage voters and foreigners; double / multiple registration, exclusion of names of eligible individuals, inclusion of names of eligible individuals with mistakes, errors or out of date information, under registration of specific demographic (i.e. women, youth and PWDs) and marginalization of various areas / regions.

According to Article one of the Constitution of Kenya (CoK), 2010, Sovereign power belongs to the people of Kenya and this power is delegated to state organs as stipulated in Article 3<sup>11</sup>. The IEBC therefore plays a key role in ensuring that eligible Kenyans are able to exercise sovereign power by ensuring that a credible RoV is maintained at all times. This mandate is bestowed to the Commission under Article 88(4) that requires that IEBC to undertake continuous registration of citizens as voters and to regularly revise the voters' roll. Part of the general principles of the Kenya electoral system as stipulated in Article 81 of the Constitution are freedom of citizens to exercise their political rights as stipulated under Article 38, fair representation of persons with disabilities, universal suffrage based on the aspirations for fair representation and equality of vote. Article 83 of the Constitution stipulates that for one to be registered as a voter he/she must be an adult citizen, should not be declared to be of unsound mind, should not be convicted of an election offence during the preceding five years and one should be registered at only one polling station. The Constitution also provides that administrative arrangements for the registration of voters and the conduct of elections shall be designed to facilitate and not deny an eligible citizen the right to vote or stand for an election. This means that it is the mandate of IEBC to ensure that an accurate, complete and up to date register is maintained to enable Kenyans exercises their sovereign power.

Despite the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution and enactment of a raft of laws and regulations on voter registration, concerns on the integrity of the RoV still persists. For example, after the 2013 general elections, a total of 188 Election Petitions were filed in Court, including an election petition on the presidential election that was determined by the Supreme Court. The Register of Voters was one of the critical areas of contestation in the Supreme Court petition. Opinion Polls and surveys conducted during the 2017 pre- election period showed low ratings of public confidence in the Commission with regard to management of the 2017 general elections, which culminated, to the street protests to advocate for reforms within the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).

The intervention of the religious leaders saw the formation of Joint Parliamentary Select Committee (JPSC), which drafted the Elections Amendment Bill of 2016. The Bill was presented to the parliament and was unanimously passed without amendments resulting to the enactment of (Amendment) Act, No. 36 of 2016.

<sup>11</sup> CoK, 2010, Article 1 & 3

The Act in section 8A, mandated the IEBC to at least six months before a general election, engage a professional reputable firm to conduct an audit of the Register of Voters for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the Register; recommending mechanisms for enhancing the accuracy of the Register; and updating the Register. The Commission engaged KPMG, which undertook the audit and shared the report with the IEBC.

As part of its strategy to safeguard the integrity of the 2017 General Elections, the Elections Observation Group implemented a project whose impact was to contribute towards a more credible 2017 general election. One of the outcomes of the project was to have an effective engagement of Kenyan Citizens in observing and monitoring the 2017 electoral processes. One of the major activities that ELOG envisaged to undertake during the pre-election period was an independent assessment of the RoV to inform strategies for ensuring its integrity for the 2017 general elections. However, the assessment was not undertaken before elections due to time constraints. After the August 8<sup>th</sup> General elections, ELOG undertook a computer analysis of 19,611,423 records in the register but field test was not undertaken since the political environment was not conducive after the 26<sup>th</sup> October 2018 repeat presidential elections.

It against this backdrop, that ELOG undertook the Field test RoV assessment in order to complement the ELOG computer test findings as well as KPMG findings. It is expected that both ELOG report and KPMG RoV reports will form a concrete basis for strengthening voter registration and maintenance of a credible register for future elections and referenda in Kenya.

## **1.2. Purpose for the Assessment of the 2017 Register of Voters**

The purpose for assessing the quality of the RoV that was used on 8<sup>th</sup> August General Elections is to establish its accuracy, completeness and timeliness in order to inform interventions for the realization of a credible register for future elections in Kenya. The assessment also complements the KPMG audit report that was based purely on computer logical tests of the 19,646,673 records in the register. The assessment also seeks to make comparisons on the quality of the register that was used during the 2013 general elections and that which was used on 8<sup>th</sup> August 2017 general elections. The findings of this assessment will also be compared with those of KPMG. The assessment also seeks to enhance public confidence and trust in the voter registration process in Kenya after the August 8<sup>th</sup> 2017 General

Elections. Therefore, it is expected that the assessment findings will contribute to improving and strengthening voter registration and compilation of a credible RoV which is a cornerstone for exercising sovereign power by Kenyans as provided in Article one of the CoK.

### **1.3. Objectives of the assessment of the Register of Voters**

The assessment of the RoV was undertaken in order to achieve the following objectives:

- To ascertain the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of the 2017 Register of Voters (RoV).
- To establish reasons for lack of registration of approximately 5.6<sup>12</sup> million eligible voters as reported by the KPMG RoV audit report.
- To compare the quality of the RoV that was used on 4<sup>th</sup> March 2013 general elections with the 2017 RoV.
- To make recommendations that would improve voter registration processes and compilation and maintenance of a credible RoV for future elections and referenda in Kenya.

### **1.4. Significance of the Assessment of the 2017 Registers Voters**

All over the world, high premium is placed on the need for a credible register of voters. Compilation of an accurate, comprehensive and up to date register is regarded as the most rigorous and perhaps the most important activity during the pre-elections period. Credible RoV have a direct impact to the enhancement of democratic culture and realization of peoples' civil and political rights. It is an empowerment to the citizens towards exercising their sovereign power in forming the government and rendering its legitimacy.

The findings and recommendations of the VLA exercise are significant to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) as it is the body mandated legally to continuously register citizens as voters and compile and maintain a credible register<sup>12</sup>. Specifically, the findings and recommendations are expected to inform the IEBC strategies for enhancing the integrity of RoV for future elections and referenda in Kenya.

The report is also significant to the government agencies that capture and maintain important data that play a crucial role to voter registration. These include National

<sup>12</sup> KPMG Independent Audit of 2017 RoV, P.21

<sup>13</sup> See article 88(4)(a)(b)

Registration Bureau (NRB), Registrar of Births and Deaths, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). It is expected that the VLA findings will trigger debate and inform strategies for data capture, coverage and storage that are employed by these institutions.

The report is also significant to the political parties as they play a key role in the democratization process. It will also be significant to the entire public in enhancing their confidence and trust in the Commission and in the voter registration processes.

### **1.5. Scope and Delimitation of the Assessment**

The VLA was undertaken in all the 47 Counties in Kenya in 600 sample polling stations (**see Table 4.1 on VLA sample distribution**). Due to logistical challenges, the diaspora voters and prisoners were not included in the field Assessment but their details were analyzed through computer tests.

### **1.6. Organization of the Report**

The VLA survey report is organized in seven chapters. Chapter one provides the background information of the survey. It documents information on what Biometric Voter Registration process entails, the purpose of assessing the quality of the Register of Voters (RoV), objectives of the assessment, significance of the assessment, scope and delimitation of the study.

Chapter two presents a comparative analysis of VLA findings and recommendations for three VLA's. These are the VLA conducted in 2010, 2013 and KPMG. Chapter three provides information on the methodology that was used. It gives an in-depth explanation on what computer test analysis and People-to-List field test entails. It also documents how the VLA sample was drawn as well as development of VLA training materials. This chapter also documents how recruitment and training of VLA Trainer of Trainers (ToTs) and other field personnel was undertaken.

Chapter four of the report presents VLA findings in figures and tables and offers interpretation of the findings. Chapter five of the report documents the survey conclusions and recommendations to the various stakeholders particularly to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the National Registration Bureau (NRB), the National Assembly, the media and civil society organizations. Chapter six documents some of the survey limitations and lessons learned while chapter seven provide a list of appendices to the report

## CHAPTER 2

### HIGHLIGHTS OF KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF REGISTER OF VOTERS ASSESSMENTS IN KENYA SINCE 2010

#### 2.1. Highlights of IED Report of the Quality of RoV used during the 2010 Constitutional Referendum.

IED assessed the quality of the voters' register that was compiled afresh by the then Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC). The register was compiled in 2010 and was used to conduct the 2010 Constitutional Referendum and subsequent by-elections emanating from the 2007 general elections. Table 2.1 summarizes the 2012 VLA methodology, findings and recommendations<sup>14</sup>

**Table 2.1:** Summary of the Methodology, Findings and Recommendations from 2010 VLA Report

<b>2010 Projected Eligible Voters</b>	<b>20,985,159</b>	
<b>2010 Registered voters</b>	12,461,689	
<b>2010 National Voter Registration Rate</b>	59%	
<b>Methodology</b>	Computer Tests and people –to- list test	
<b>2010 VLA sample</b>	1,119	
<b>VLA Area of Focus</b>	<b>Findings</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Youth Voter Registration Statistics</b>	Out of the 20,985,159 Voting populations, 11,970,167 (57%) were youth.  Out of 11,970,167 eligible youth 4,988,553 (42%) were registered <sup>15</sup>	IEBC to mount a targeted voter education for youth voters
<b>Women Voter Registration Statistics</b>	Despite women accounting for 51% of the total eligible voters, their registration rate was 49% as opposed to men whose registration rate was 51%. This represented a 2% under registration for women	IEBC to mount a targeted voter education for women

<sup>14</sup> IED (2010). Report on the Quality of the 2010 RoV, PP 1-11

<sup>15</sup> IED (2010). Report on the Quality of the 2010 RoV, p. 35

<p><b>Major Reason for NOT registering as a voter</b></p>	<p>57.7 % of the respondents who did not register to participate in the Constitutional Referendum cited Lack of National Identity Card as the main impediment to voter registration</p>	<p>The IEBC in collaboration with the NRB and the Registrar of Persons to mount targeted campaigns to sensitize and create awareness amongst the youth and those turning 18 years old and appeal to them to apply for and acquire national ID cards.</p>
<p><b>Location of Polling stations</b></p>	<p>Most of the polling stations were located where the voters reside. Only a few (1.6%) of the respondents cited long distances to the polling stations as a hindrance to voter registration.</p>	<p>The report commended IEBC for locating over 98% of polling stations near to voter's residence</p>
<p><b>Constituencies with higher women registered voters</b></p>	<p>The five constituencies that had the highest number of women registered than men were Ganze which had a total of 33,837 registered voters of whom 21,166(63%) were women; Turkana Central with a total of 47,679 registered voters of whom 29,174(61%) were women; Turkana North with a total of 36,146 of whom 21,820(60%) were women; Turkana South with a total of 24,810 registered voters of whom 14,945(60%) were women; and Laisamis which had 19,496 registered voters of whom 11,278(58%) were women.</p>	<p>Research should be undertaken by IEBC or other organizations to establish the reasons behind few men registering in constituencies in Turkana County, Ganze and Laisamis Constituencies.</p>

<p><b>Constituencies with lowest women registered voters</b></p>	<p>The five constituencies which had the lowest number of registered women compared to the total registered voters were Westlands which had 135,773 registered voters of whom 53,881(40%) were women; Changamwe with a total of 89,854 with only 35,874 being women; Starehe Constituency with 134,963 with only 52,331(39%) being women; Langata constituency with 159,501 registered voters had 62,757(39%) women registered; Mvita with a total of 66,796 registered voters with only 25,234(38%) women</p>	<p>Strategies for reaching out to women should be intensified in urban areas since as evidenced by these statistics are among the constituencies that have recorded low ratios of women registration in 2010.</p>
<p><b>Youth and non-Youth registration statistics</b></p>	<p>Out of the 12,461,689 registered voters in the register, youth accounted for 4,988,553(40%: while non-youth accounted for 60%).</p>	<p>Various avenues should be explored including social media, radio, mobile telephony and edutainment sessions to reach out to youth voters. The IEBC should partner with relevant Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs), particularly those that work with youth, to support youth outreach.</p>
<p><b>Registration rates for 18-19 years</b></p>	<p>Out of the estimated 1,720,242 eligible voters aged 18-19 as at December 2011, only 1,090 were registered in 2010 Constitutional register accounting for 0.1%.</p>	<p>Initiate ID acquisition process in High school. Mount voter education for this group.</p>

<b>Document mostly used for registering as a voter</b>	99% of those who recorded having registered as voters used national identification cards for purposes of voter registration compared to only 0.5% who used passports.	Simplify ID acquisition process and shorten the period for ID processing
<b>Inspection of voter's register</b>	54% of the registered voters do not inspect their details in the voters' register during the period set aside by the Electoral Commission for inspection.	IEBC to sensitize the voters on the importance of inspecting the register. IEBC to use the polling stations for inspection of voters' register since many Kenyans can access them
<b>Source of information on voter registration</b>	The radio and the local chiefs and sub-chiefs play a significant role as the source of information on voter registration at 32% and 24% respectively.	The IEBC should mainly use national and local/regional FM radio and the local chiefs and sub-chiefs. Other channels such as TV, internet and new social media, churches/ mosques, and the print media should also be used.
<b>Accuracy of the register</b>	Out of the 1,354,692 EVR records, 34,611(2.6%) had errors. Most of the errors were duplicate ID numbers (1.4%) and duplicates of the elector's card numbers (1.1%). This could be a sign of double/ multiple registrations Out of the 11,106,997 OMR records 501,332 (4.5%) had errors. Most of the errors were duplicate ID number (2.4%) and duplicate in elector's card numbers (1.4%). This equally could suggest double or multiple registrations in the register.	IEBC should put in place practical measures for detecting double/ multiple registrations during the BVR voter registration exercise. IEBC to adhere to the law and penalize those who register more than once since it is illegal.

## 2.2. IED Report on the quality of the 2013 Principle RoV

The Institute for Education in Democracy (IED) assessed the quality of the principal register of voters that was used on 4th March 2013 general elections with an aim of establishing its accuracy, comprehensiveness and timeliness. Table 2.2 summaries the 2013 VLA methodology, findings and recommendations.

**Table 2.2:** Summary of the Methodology, Findings and Recommendations from 2013 VLA Report

2013 Eligible Voters	21,191,491 Female: 10,873,546(51%) Male: 10,318,035 (49%) Youth: 12,074,765	
2013 Registered voters	14,388,781	
2013 National Voter Registration Rate	68% representing a 9% increase from 2010 referendum	
Methodology	Computer Tests and people –to- list test	
2013 VLA sample	1,992	
<b>VLA Area of Focus</b>	<b>Findings</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
Details in the RoV	The principal register of voters lacked important voters' details as provided in <b>Form A</b> <sup>16</sup> contained in registration of voter's regulations	IEBC adhere to the voter registration regulations and procedures as provided in the law.
Diaspora Registration	A total of 2,637 Kenyans in the Diaspora were registered from the East African countries namely Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda	- IEBC should liaise with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) to avail demographic data of Kenyans in the Diaspora and where they are concentrated. The data will inform logistical planning and development of diaspora registration and voting policy.

<sup>16</sup> See Registration of Voters Regulations, 2012 p. 12

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Establishment of a separate unit within the Commission that is mandated with the management of the out of the country voter registration and voting procedures. This should closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KNBS, the Diaspora community and other stakeholders to ensure that Diaspora voting rights are increasingly realized.</li> <li>- Determine the criteria for country selection where the Commission would like to franchise voters first.</li> <li>- IEBC to establish temporary polling stations and polling stations where there are high concentrations of the Diaspora</li> <li>- IEBC should adopt a consultative approach to develop a comprehensive Diaspora voter registration and voting policy.</li> <li>- IEBC should develop a continuous voter education strategy for the Kenyans in the Diaspora.</li> <li>- IEBC should develop Diaspora observer guidelines to guide out of country elections observation and Monitoring exercise</li> </ul>
Women Voter registration	Statistics revealed that despite there being more women eligible voters, their registration rate is 65% which is 6% lower than that of men <sup>17</sup>	IEBC to mount a targeted voter education for women
Youth Voter Registration Statistics	Out of the 12,074,765 eligible youth voters in 2013, 6,942,253 were registered accounting for (57%). This was an increase of 15 % from 2010 statistics	This trend should be maintained and improved further

<sup>17</sup> See IED 2013 Audit report p.5

<p>Registration of 18-19-year olds</p>	<p>Under registration of youth aged 18-19 years old was noted. Out of the 14,352,544 records in the register of voters with biometrics, the 18 years was 0.8% while that of the 19 years was 2%. These minimal registrations of the 18-19 years old were realized despite the fact that there were approximately 966,560 and 768,714 eligible 18-19-year-old respectively.</p>	<p>NRB to come up with strategies for ID application for High School children.</p> <p>Mount effective voter education for this youth group.</p>
<p>Performance of voter registration per county</p>	<p>In 2013 the best performing counties in terms of voter registration rates were Lamu where 91% of the eligible voters were registered followed by Kiambu (81%), Nyandarua (79%), Muranga (79%), Nyeri (78%), Kajiado (78%) and Nairobi (78%). These counties were able to register more than 75% of the eligible voters. The worst performing counties in terms of voter registration rates are West Pokot (53%), Wajir (41%), Garissa (38%), Turkana (32%) and Mandera (29%).</p>	<p>IEBC to develop effective Voter education strategies, which target counties that continue to perform poorly during voter registration.</p>

<p>Constituencies with higher women registered voters</p>	<p>The first five Constituencies with the highest number of women registered voters than men are Ganze which has a total of 36,926 registered voters of whom 24,075 (65%) are women, Loima Constituency with a total of 18,634 registered voters of whom 11,748(63%) are women, Turkana North Constituency with 23,683 registered voters of whom 14,782 (62%) are women, Mandera South Constituency with 10,062 registered voters of whom 6,392(60%) are women and Turkana East Constituency with 11,062 voters of whom 6,542(59%) are women.</p>	<p>Research should be undertaken by IEBC or other organizations to establish the reasons behind few men registering in constituencies in Turkana County, Ganze and Laisamis Constituencies and devise strategies for reaching out to male voters</p>
<p>Youth and non-Youth registration statistics</p>	<p>Out of the 14,388,781 registered voters in the register, youth accounted for 6,942,253 (48%) while non-youth accounted for (52%).</p>	<p>Various avenues should be explored including social media, radio, mobile telephony and edutainment sessions. The IEBC should also partner with relevant Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs), particularly those that work with youth, to support youth outreach.</p>
<p>Inspection of voter's register</p>	<p>The 2013 VLA revealed that the number of voters inspecting the register increased from the 2010 46% to 78% in 2013. This represents an increase of about 38%.</p>	<p>IEBC to sensitizing the voters on the importance of inspecting the register. IEBC to use the polling stations for inspection of voters' register since many Kenyans can access them</p>

Source of information on voter registration	The 2013 VLA revealed that the radio is the most effective channel. The radio was cited by 41.6% of the respondents who indicated that they received information on BVR through radio. This is followed by television cited by 13.4% of the	The IEBC should mainly use national and local/regional FM radio and the local chiefs and sub- chiefs. Other channels such as TV, internet and new social media, churches/ mosques, and the print media should also be used.
Accuracy of the register	An analysis of 14,352,544 records in the biometric voter's register revealed that 143,530 records had errors.	IEBC should put in place practical measures for detecting double/multiple registrations during the BVR voter registration exercise. IEBC to adhere to the law and penalize those who register more than once since it is illegal.

### 2.3. KPMG Report on the quality of the 2017 RoV

The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission contracted KPMG Kenya to carry out an audit of the Register of Voters as provided for under the Constitution and the 2016 Elections Laws Amendment Act<sup>18</sup>. The mandate of KPMG was to verify the accuracy of the Register; recommend mechanisms for enhancing its accuracy and updating the Register.

KPMG assessed the accuracy, completeness and validity of voter registration details and particulars of 19,646,673 records in the 2017 register of voters. KPMG deployed internal and external logical computer test analysis that were aimed at identifying duplicate records, orphaned or incomplete records, and confirm the existence of relevant details as required by the law i.e. Name, ID, Gender, Biometric Information and polling station among other details in the Register. The report was shared with the IEBC in June 2017.

<sup>18</sup> Elections Amendment Act, Act Number 36 of 2016 (commenced on 4th October, 2016)

**Table 2.3:** Summary of the Methodology, Findings and Recommendations from KPMG Report

<b>Eligible Population as per KNBS</b>	25, 215,055	
<b>Total Registered Voters</b>	19,646,673	
<b>Methodology</b>	Internal and External logical computer tests	
<b>Audit Area of Focus</b>	<b>Findings</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<b>Voter registration Legal Framework</b>	<p>-The audit of the Register of Voters is anchored in the sovereign power of the people set out in Article 1 of the Constitution.</p> <p>- This sovereign power is the foundation of the Constitution under Article 1 and reinforced under Articles 10 with regard to participation of the people, Article 38 with regard to political rights, Articles 81 and 86 relating to principles for the electoral process and voting respectively, Article 83 on qualifications to register as a voter, and Article 249 on the protection of sovereign power by independent Commissions</p> <p>- The actual performance in the registration process against targets indicates that not all the people embrace this sovereign power and there is some degree of apathy and dilatory behavior by qualified citizens.</p>	<p>That IEBC works with other stakeholders to provide civic / voter education to equip citizens with the knowledge and understanding that they require to exercise the sovereign rights under the Constitution.</p> <p>Commission to be more proactive in the process of registration and in particular, invoke Article 35<sup>19</sup> of the Constitution to require other departments of Government to provide the information they hold to enable the Commission to update the RoV.</p>
<b>Rationalization of the registration of deaths</b>	<p>While the Births and Deaths Registration Act made the registration of deaths mandatory with effect from September 1971, the Regulations remain weak and ineffective.</p> <p>There is no unique identifier that can integrate a record of birth to an identity card, passport (PP) or RoV.</p>	<p>Legal framework for the registration of births and deaths be reviewed to:</p> <p>Establish a unique identifier for every person, from registration at birth, to the ID and PP, to registration of death</p> <p>Provide for the use of technology in maintaining up to date death and Birth records</p>

<b>Clarification on expired passports as an identification document during voting</b>	The Law is currently unclear on the use in voter identification during voting of a previously valid Passport (PP), which has since expired.	Recommends that the Elections Act and the Elections (Registration of Voters) Regulations be amended to expressly provide that one cannot vote using an expired PP
<b>Data used for the Audit<sup>20</sup></b>	National Passports Data -certified by the Director of Immigration as provided in section 5 of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act or provided in section 16 of the Kenya Citizenship and Foreign Nationals Management Service Act.	1,291,576 (dated 13 <sup>th</sup> April, 2017)
	Provisional Biographic Register of Voters duly certified by the Commission Secretary / CEO.	19,646,673 (dated 24 <sup>th</sup> April 2017)
	Data on National IDs from the Principal Registrar of Persons under the National Registration Bureau in accordance with section 5 of Registration of Persons Act	25,323,059 (dated 15 <sup>th</sup> May 2017)
	Data on Deaths from the Principal Registrar of Births and Deaths appointed under section 3 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act	435,175 (dated 19 <sup>th</sup> May 2017)
	2017 Eligible Voters from KNBS	25, 215,055
<b>Availability of the register of birth</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Register of Births was not provided for purposes of audit.</li> <li>- There is no unique identifier maintained in the Register of Births that would enable the linking of the particulars in the Register of birth to the particulars in the Register of RoV to establish the number of underage voters in the register</li> </ul>	- State considers implementing an integrated Citizen Registration system, which facilitates the linking of persons' records through the use of a unique personal identifier throughout the full lifecycle of an individual.

<sup>19</sup> It states that every citizen has the right to access to information held by the state; and information held by another person and required for the exercise or protection of any right or fundamental freedoms

<sup>20</sup> See KPMG Report P.25

<b>National Voter Registration Rate</b>	According to KNBS total eligible voters in 2017 were 25, 215,055. Computing this against 19,646,673 registered voters accounts for a National registration rate was 77.9%	This should be strengthened in future elections
<b>Issuance of National Identity Cards</b>	By August 2017, a total of 25,325,059 national Identity Cards had been issued by NRB	
<b>Sharing of data by other Government Agencies that is relevant to voter registration and compilation of a credible register.</b>	- There are no formal procedures for multi-agency collaboration in the provision of the comparison data and hence posing a challenge in obtaining the data.	Commission to be more proactive in the process of registration and in particular, invoke Article 35 <sup>21</sup> of the Constitution to require other departments of Government to provide the information they hold to enable the Commission to update the RoV.
<b>Accuracy of the register of deaths</b>	The quality and completeness of the data on the Register of Deaths raised a number of issues and considerable work needs to be done to improve coverage in the registration of deaths, the accuracy of the data capture, and collation of complete records.	That the inaccuracies identified be rectified and use of biometric identification of voters as the primary mechanism on polling day.
<b>Biometric Voter Registration Processes and System</b>	The BVR system setup necessitates manual transfer of enrolment files from the BVR kits at the registration centers to the regional centers using flash disks. The enrolment files are transferred to regional servers for upload to the head office via online or offline transfer processes.	The invalid details identified need to be investigated and rectified to enhance the accuracy of the particulars in the register.

<sup>21</sup> It states that every citizen has the right to access to information held by the state; and information held by another person and required for the exercise or protection of any right or fundamental freedoms

<p><b>Input and validation controls over applications for voter registration</b></p>	<p>The enrolment screen on the BVR kit does not have input controls to enforce the requirements over the validity of voter eligibility documents, national identity document (ID) number or a passport. As a result, it is possible to capture invalid details and particulars in the BVR systems e.g. alphabetic characters in ID number field and numeric characters only in the passport field.</p>	<p>IEBC to review the BVR Kit data capture system.</p>
<p><b>Invalid ID and Passport Numbers</b></p>	<p>KPMG noted 60,853 voter records in the RoV with invalid ID details and 6,872 records with invalid PP numbers. Further, there was a voter record without ID or PP number details<sup>22</sup>. Were invalid identification document Numbers that do not conform to the standard formats adopted by the relevant state agencies and names in the identification number field, names comprising numeric characters only, passports without expiry dates and IDs with expiry dates.</p>	<p>The invalid details identified need to be investigated and rectified to enhance the accuracy of the particulars in the register.</p>
<p><b>ID and Passport Number in the RoV not matching with NRB and DIS Data</b></p>	<p>KPMG analyzed the current RoV ID numbers against NRB data and noted that the RoV had 171,476 voter records without matching ID numbers.  KPMG also analyzed the RoV PP numbers against data from Department of Immigration Services and noted that there were 17,523 voter records without matching PP numbers.</p>	<p>KPMG recommended that the Commission investigate and adjudicates the exceptions noted from the audit. KPMG recommended that the Commission should periodically compare the RoV against ID data and Passport data from the and the Department of Immigration Services respectively.</p>

<sup>22</sup> KPMG Audit report p. 35

<p><b>Presence of voter records with the same identity document numbers</b></p>	<p>KPMG noted that there were 197,677 voter records with shared ID/PP numbers<sup>23</sup>.</p>	<p>IEBC to review the BVR system to introduce a feature to restrict a new registration having an ID or passport number that already exists in the RoV.</p>
<p><b>BVR Kit Records</b></p>	<p>No centralized BVR kit records showing the serial numbers of BVR Kits by location</p>	<p>That the Commission prepares a central master list of BVR kits with serial numbers on the basis of delivery notes. The Commission to carry out a stock take of the current BVR kits, record their serial numbers and reconcile this against the master list to establish that all BVR kits are accounted for.</p>
<p><b>Removal of deceased persons from the Register</b></p>	<p>The removal of deceased voters presents one of the biggest challenges for the Commission since there is no central electronic list of the number of deceased kept in the country by Civil Registration Services (CRS). IEBC resorts to collecting the information on its own through its registration officers who liaise with the sub county offices, and health institutions to collect information on deceased<sup>24</sup>.</p> <p>The diseased persons data collected is not always accurate and fit for purpose for the IEBC. The records in many instances lack ID Numbers of the deceased persons, and in other cases the ID number represents the person who reported the death. IEBC cannot rely on the diseased records provided.</p>	<p>Registrar of Birth and deaths to compile and maintain accurate Electronic List of the deceased and those who were being born.</p>

<sup>23</sup> KPMG Report.36

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. p.38

<p><b>Low registration coverage for births and deaths</b></p>	<p>The published death registration coverage rates average at 40.66% for the past five years<sup>25</sup> (2012 – 2016) against the expected death population of 1,534,009. There remain 912,177 unregistered deaths.</p>	<p>CRS provide complete and detailed lists of death records</p>
<p><b>Records of dead voters in the RoV</b></p>	<p>There are 92,277 records of deceased persons who are in the 2017 RoV with a matching ID and names.</p> <p>135,563 of the certified records of deceased from CRS above the age of 18 years do not bear ID numbers. In the absence of relevant ID numbers, it is not possible to compare these records against the RoV to determine if they exist in the register of voters.</p> <p>There were 33,626 detailed of death registration records for persons whose age were not recorded and without IDs, hence was not possible to compare these records against the RoV to determine if they exist in the register of voters.</p> <p>The expected death population of for the period between 2012 – 2016 was 1,534,009.</p> <p>There remain 912,177 unregistered deaths in the period 2012 - 2016. There is a potential for additional 1,037,260-deceased persons in the RoV.</p> <p>The process of update of the register with deceased voters is severely ineffective.</p>	<p>CRS provide complete and detailed lists of death records</p> <p>Commission should develop a policy on the removal of dead persons from the voter’s register.</p> <p>The National Registration Bureau, the Kenya, Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service and all other relevant agencies and institutions that hold information on Kenyan citizens should avail the information to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission electronically for cross-referencing and information sharing.</p> <p>CRS needs to implement measures to improve death registration coverage across the country.</p> <p>Commission utilizes biometric identification of voters as a primary mechanism on polling day.</p>

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.p.38

<p><b>Total Number of Records with Errors in out of the 19,646,673</b></p>	<p>The total number of records that had at least one irregular exception, including ID cards for deceased persons was 502,409 this represents 2.56% percentage of the Register of voters<sup>26</sup>.</p> <p>The total number of records that had at least one irregular exception, excluding ID cards for deceased persons, based on our analysis was 411,503 this represents 2.10% percentage of the Register of voters.</p>	<p>The Commission to review the BVR Kit Data capture system</p> <p>Commission utilizes biometric identification of voters as a primary mechanism on polling day.</p>
<p><b>First Five Counties with highest Registered voters</b></p>	<p>Analysis of the geographical distribution of the register of voters indicates Nairobi County has the largest concentration of registered voters at (11.50%), followed by Kiambu County (6.03%), Nakuru County (4.86%), Kakamega County (3.79%) and Meru County (3.57%).</p>	<p>Effective strategies to reach out to eligible voters should be implemented</p>
<p><b>Last Five Counties with lowest Registered voters</b></p>	<p>Lamu (0.35%), Isiolo (0.39%), Samburu (0.42%), Tana River (0.60%) and Marsabit (0.72%).</p>	<p>Effective strategies to reach out to eligible voters should be implemented</p>
<p><b>Registration of 18-19 Year old's</b></p>	<p>Voter registration amongst the 18-19-year old's is significantly low at (1.05%) of the total registered voters, for a population that makes up (8.19%<sup>27</sup>).</p> <p>Number of IDs issued to this age group is only (1.99%) of the total number of issued IDs</p>	<p>Measure to be put in place to effectively reach out to voters coming of age e.g. having registration centres at colleges and universities</p>
<p><b>Registration of youth by County</b></p>	<p>Mandera, Nairobi, Kisumu, Wajir and Garissa counties had the highest proportions of youth registered. Muranga, Makueni, Kirinyaga, Nyeri and Vihiga counties had the lowest proportions of youth enrolment.</p>	

<sup>26</sup> KPMG Report, P.46

<sup>27</sup> KPMG Report, P.51

<p><b>Registration Rates per County</b></p>	<p>Registration rates (the number of eligible voting population against the number of registered voters), indicated that Kiambu County had the highest enrolment rate at 110.90%, followed by Nairobi (110.31%), Lamu (105.52%), Kirinyaga (102.81%) and Nyeri (102.28%) amongst the top five. Mandera County has the lowest enrolment rate (26.28%) followed by Turkana (34.25%), Wajir (37.85%), Garissa (40.27%) and West Pokot (53.93%).</p>	
<p><b>Ratio of Men to Women in 2017 RoV</b></p>	<p>The ratio of men to women in the register of voters is 49.33% to 50.57 against national ratio of men to women of 49.71% to 50.29% (KNBS 2009 population statistics). The ratio shows a slight improvement from 2013 with ratios of 49.12% to 50.88% women to men respectively. Registration of women is conversely proportional to the national KNBS gender statistics.</p>	
<p><b>No. of Unregistered Voters in 2017</b></p>	<p>In terms of enrolments against issued IDs (NRB Data), the performance across all age groups and gender indicate a gap of 22.42% in enrolments. This represents approximately 5.7 Million eligible Kenyans who did not register to vote despite them having ID Card. This may be an indication of voter apathy and points to the need for voter education.</p>	

<b>Diaspora registration</b>	Diaspora present very low numbers of registered voters 4, 393 from five countries namely Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Africa	
<b>Prisons Registration</b>	5,528	
<b>Assessment of Voter registration system and process</b>	From the perspective of inclusiveness, the overall process was simple, transparent and inclusive.	
<b>Registration of Persons with disabilities</b>	The number of persons with disabilities registered is only 143,812 (0.73%) of the register of voters against an expected estimated population of PWDS of 1,612,404. This is considerably lower than the estimated number of PWDS estimated at 3.5% of the total population <sup>28</sup> .	The IEBC has put in place mechanisms for voter education for all persons, however targeted voter education for women, youth, PWDs, persons in the diaspora and prisoners need to be put in place <sup>29</sup> .

<sup>28</sup> KPMG Report, P.52

<sup>29</sup> KPMG Report, p.52

## CHAPTER 3

### ASSESSMENT DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1. Voters List Assessment (VLA) Design

The VLA used a Mixed Method Research (MMR) Design, where both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study are collected in order to ensure the breadth and depth of the investigation of the phenomenon under study.

#### 3.2. VLA Methodology

The Elections Observation Group (ELOG) used two methodologies to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the 2017 RoV. These are logical computer tests and statistically rigorous one-way field test (People-to- List<sup>30</sup>). The computer test involved undertaking a series of logical computer tests to analyze an electronic copy of the 2017 RoV that was shared with ELOG by IEBC. The register had a total of 19,611,423<sup>31</sup> records in the register inclusive of Diaspora (4,393) and Prisoners (5,528). The Register contained ten variables namely; ID/ Passport Number, Primary Name, Secondary Name, Birth Date, Gender, Polling station Code, polling station Name County, Constituency and Assembly Ward Name. It is important to note that there was a discrepancy in the total number of registered voters in the RoV that was shared with ELOG and that which IEBC shared with KPMG. The register that IEBC shared with KPMG had a total of 19,646,673 records. The variance of the records is represented in Figure 3.1 below.




Figure 3.1: Variance of Total Voter Records as shared by IEBC with KPMG and ELOG

ELOG analyzed 19,611,423 to determine the degree of errors and registration rates and trends for various demographic groups. It involved undertaking internal consistency tests and external consistency tests. Internal consistency tests examined issues such as duplicates records, under age voters, records with missing information and inaccurate records. On the other hand, external consistency tests compared variables such as gender breakdowns, registration rates for the youth, regional distribution and other details to external data. The external data that was used included projected voting age population as at 17<sup>th</sup> May 2017 when continuous register of Voters was completed, data for eligible voters that had acquired National Identity Cards and data on deceased voters.

### The People-to-List Survey Methodology




Figure 3.2. VLA Field Test Methodology

<sup>30</sup> People –to-List is a voters’ list assessment methodology that utilizes scientific methods to draw a sample from eligible voters (from census data) which is a representative of the eligible population, and going out to interview them to determine if there are people who are eligible to vote and who appear to have attempted to register to vote, but whose names and other details are absent or inaccurate in the register of voters.

<sup>31</sup> See Kenya Gazette Tool for Polling Stations for 2017 General Elections dated 28th June 2017

People-to- List field survey sought to determine if there were people who were eligible to vote and who appeared to have attempted to register, but whose names and other details were absent from the RoV. It was also meant to elicit information on other aspects of voter registration such as reasons for not registering as a voter, approximate distance of polling stations from voters' residence, main source of voter education information. This test involved selecting eligible voters at random and confirming their registration in the voter's register. This methodology utilized a sample, which was a representation of the projected voting population as at 17<sup>th</sup> May 2017. In order to draw a nationally representative sample for the People - to - List field test, the RoV was acquired from the IEBC. This was dated 28<sup>th</sup> June 2017. The official list of all the polling stations with disaggregated data per polling station was also acquired.

### **3.3. VLA Target Population**

VLA exercise targeted both male and female eligible voters as 17<sup>th</sup> May 2017; registered or not registered.

### **3.4. VLA Sample and Sampling Procedures**

ELOG engaged a professional statistician to draw the VLA Sample. A multistage stratified random sampling method was used to draw a nationally representative sample for the People-to- List test. Using statistical principles of random sampling, a nationally representative sample of 600 stations was drawn from the official list of the polling stations provided by the IEBC.

The official list of all the polling stations shared by the IEBC had a total of 40,770 polling stations (excluding polling stations at the prisons and the diaspora). The sample contained polling stations in all the 47 counties. In each of the 600 sampled polling stations, four respondents (two male and two female), who confirmed to have attempted to register as voters, were randomly selected to participate in the People-to- List interviews. Therefore, the survey had a total of 2,400 respondents who were identified using scientific procedures. The sampling margin of error for the People-to- List test is +/- 2 % at 95% confidence level.

The procedures included establishing a start point within the sampled polling station and using a random route walk of five households in the rural areas and ten households in the urban areas and using household selection criteria to

identify a respondent within the selected household in clustered houses or flats whilst maintaining gender quota. The People-to-List fieldwork took place from 23<sup>rd</sup> to 30<sup>th</sup> March 2018.

It is important to note that the response rate for the VLA field survey was 95%. This means that as much as ELOG had planned to interview 2,400 respondents, the interviewers managed to interview 2,280 respondents. This was due to challenges of securing interviews with the respondents even after several back checks. Therefore, this report is an account of voter registration details of 19,611,423 registered voters in the RoV used on 8<sup>th</sup> August 2017 and 2,280 respondents drawn from the 570-sampled polling stations representing the 47 counties in Kenya.

### **3.5. Development of the VLA Training Materials**

A number of training materials were developed and utilized during the training of VLA Trainer of Trainers (ToTs) and field personnel. This ensured standardization of all trainings. Some of the training materials that were developed included the VLA questionnaire both in English and Kiswahili, the VLA Training Manual, spot checking forms, back checking forms, household selection grid, Constituency Elections Coordinators interview guide and training agenda for the different levels of trainings.

### **3.6. Recruitment and Training of VLA Trainer of Trainers and Field Personnel**

The VLA Trainer of Trainers (ToTs) were drawn from ELOG steering committee members. In total, 6 (3 male and 3 female) Trainer of Trainers were recruited. The VLA field personnel composed of the interviewers, supervisors and spot checkers. Recruitment of the VLA field personnel was based on ELOG's database of election observers who were engaged in the observation of the 2017 general elections.

### **3.7. Recruitment and Training of VLA Trainer of Trainers (ToTs)**

Engaging competent VLA personnel is one of the key ingredients for a successful VLA exercise. To this end ELOG conducted a series of trainings to enhance the capacity of various groups that were recruited to support in the undertaking of the VLA survey. The first level training was that of VLA Trainer of Trainers. This training took place from 16<sup>th</sup> March 2018 at NCKK. The purpose of this training was to prepare the trainers and impart facilitation skills for the training of VLA field personnel. The content covered during this training included facilitation skills,

introduction to VLA, purpose for undertaking VLA exercise, VLA household and respondent selection criteria, the VLA questionnaire, quality control mechanisms, interview techniques, interviewers code of conduct, challenges and mitigation strategies, deployment plan and reporting.

The second level training was for the spot checkers. This training took place on 17<sup>th</sup> March 2018 at Methodist Guest House. The third level training was for the interviewers and supervisors. This training took place at same venue from 19<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2018. In order to have effective training participants were divided into four training groups of 30 trainees. Each training group had two facilitators and one rapporteur. These trainings mainly focused on the VLA questionnaire, household and respondent selection criteria, interview techniques, roles of interviewers, supervisors and spot checkers, quality control mechanisms, understanding the reporting strategy, challenges during interviewing process and how to mitigate them and logistics. All trainings were effectively undertaken and evaluation made to determine those who qualified to be deployed. The evaluation was based on practical skills and knowledge on sampling procedures and interview skills and techniques.

### **3.8. VLA Field Work**

Deployment to various counties in the sampled polling stations to undertake the VLA exercise took place from 23<sup>rd</sup> to 30<sup>th</sup> March 2018. The deployment was based on the deployment plan, which mainly focused on the clustering of the sampled polling stations per county. ELOG successfully conducted interviews in 570 polling stations with a total of 2,280 respondents. This accounts for a response rate of 95%.

During fieldwork, supervisors and spot checkers ensured that the interviewers strictly adhered to household and respondent selection criteria. The interviewers were responsible for completing the VLA questionnaire during the interviews. They had been trained to capture the respondent's responses as accurately as possible and to probe further for any clarification. Each interviewer was required to conduct four interviews per day and complete four questionnaires. The supervisor accompanied at least one interview per polling station and back checked one out the four interviews not accompanied.

The spot checkers ensured that they spot-checked the work of the supervisors and interviewers. In total they spot-checked at least one interview per polling station either physically or by phone. All completed questionnaires; back check forms and CEC interview guide were handed over to the supervisor for verification and later submitted to the ELOG Office.

### 3.9. VLA Data Collection Tools

VLA utilized a structured questionnaire with closed and open-ended questions and interview guide. The interview guide was used to gather information from CEC's on voter registration.

### 3.10. Data Processing, Analysis and Reporting

All data from verified VLA questionnaires was transmitted to ELOG VLA database through a telerivet<sup>32</sup> messaging platform. The Telerivet SMS reporting system required the interviewer to complete sections A, B and C of the VLA questionnaire responses by sending the keyword **vla** and thereafter send the keyword **eval** so as to complete section **D** of the questionnaire. The Reporting Mechanism for the questionnaires was through SMS. This was more like a dialogue with the ELOG server. The interviewer was required to start the dialogue by sending a keyword to trigger the questions from the server. The ELOG telerivet platform Server accepted three types of responses. First there were the multiple-choice questions that required a response from one choice only. The interviewer was required to reply with a numeric code assigned to that choice. Second, there were questions that did not have multiple choices (Open Ended questions). This required interviewers to reply to the question with a brief SMS text. Third there were questions that had multiple choices. The respondent was required to choose more than one choice but separating them with a comma. E.g. 1,4,9.

Afterwards the VLA data was transmitted via telerivet platform, all completed physical copies of the questionnaires, back checking forms, spot checking forms and interview guides they were submitted to ELOG office via courier services. After submission, the questionnaires were verified and examined for inconsistencies or any missing information and other gaps. The interviewers, supervisors and spot checkers were contacted to address any gaps found in the data they shared. Before data entry process began, the ELOG secretariat, verified the voter registration

details of the respondents with those that were provided in the RoV to establish whether they matched or not. This was done with a purpose of interrogating the accuracy, currency and how up to date the RoV was. Verification with the RoV was completed on 9<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> April 2018.

After the data entry process was finalized, the data was weighed to ensure that proper estimates and generalization to the entire target population was done. After weighting, analysis was done using SPSS and a statistical report was developed.

### **3.11. Ethical considerations during the VLA Exercise**

ELOG ensured that the entire VLA exercise was conducted with high levels of ethical considerations. In this regard, ELOG only interviewed respondents who consented to the interviews. ELOG also assured all the respondents confidentiality of information they provided.

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<sup>32</sup> Telerivet is an innovative cloud – based management platform that routes messages to and from any of mobile devices. It allows organizations and individuals to communicate through short messages services using existing cell phone networks, but without mobile network integration.

## CHAPTER 4

### PRESENTATIONS, INTERPRETATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE VLA FINDINGS

#### 4.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the VLA survey findings based on the computer analysis of 19,611,423 records in the 2017 RoV. This total is inclusive of 4,393 records for the diaspora registration and 5,528 records for prisoners' registration. The findings are complemented by the People-to- List field survey findings from 2,280 respondents drawn from 570 sampled polling stations representing the 47 counties. The sampling margin of error for the field People -to- List survey was +/-2 % with 95% confidence level. ELOG adopted a comparative analysis approach where findings and recommendations from the RoV Audit reports since 2010 including those of KPMG report were analyzed, compared and presented. This was done with a purpose of documenting trends in voter registration statistics, issues identified and recommendations made and gauging the extent to which they have been implemented and changes realized over the years.

#### 4.2. VLA Sample Distribution by County

**Table 4.1:** Distribution of VLA Sample (People -to- List) by County

County	National				ELOG Sample			
	Polling Stations		Registered Voters		Polling Stations		Respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
BARINGO	892	2.18%	232,258	1.18%	7	1.17%	28	1.17%
BOMET	728	1.78%	322,012	1.64%	10	1.67%	40	1.67%
BUNGOMA	1,186	2.90%	559,850	2.86%	17	2.83%	68	2.83%
BUSIA	760	1.86%	351,048	1.79%	11	1.83%	44	1.83%
ELGEYO/ MARAkwET	529	1.29%	180,664	0.92%	6	1.00%	24	1.00%
EMBU	710	1.74%	309,468	1.58%	10	1.67%	40	1.67%
GARISSA	381	0.93%	163,350	0.83%	5	0.83%	20	0.83%
HOMA BAY	1,062	2.60%	476,875	2.43%	15	2.50%	60	2.50%
ISIOLO	195	0.48%	75,338	0.38%	3	0.50%	12	0.50%
KAJIADO	797	1.95%	411,193	2.10%	13	2.17%	52	2.17%
KAKAMEGA	1,497	3.66%	743,736	3.79%	22	3.67%	88	3.67%
KERICHO	780	1.91%	375,668	1.92%	12	2.00%	48	2.00%
KIAMBU	1,963	4.80%	1,180,920	6.02%	35	5.83%	140	5.83%

County	National				ELOG Sample			
	Polling Stations		Registered Voters		Polling Stations		Respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
KILIFI	988	2.42%	508,068	2.59%	16	2.67%	64	2.67%
KIRINYAGA	659	1.61%	349,836	1.78%	11	1.83%	44	1.83%
KISII	1,126	2.75%	546,580	2.79%	16	2.67%	64	2.67%
KISUMU	1,027	2.51%	539,210	2.75%	16	2.67%	64	2.67%
KITUI	1,454	3.56%	474,512	2.42%	15	2.50%	60	2.50%
KWALE	612	1.50%	281,041	1.43%	9	1.50%	36	1.50%
LAIKIPIA	531	1.30%	246,487	1.26%	8	1.33%	32	1.33%
LAMU	167	0.41%	69,776	0.36%	3	0.50%	12	0.50%
MACHAKOS	1,332	3.26%	620,254	3.16%	18	3.00%	72	3.00%
MAKUENI	1,060	2.59%	423,310	2.16%	13	2.17%	52	2.17%
MANDERA	401	0.98%	175,642	0.90%	6	1.00%	24	1.00%
MARSABIT	384	0.94%	141,708	0.72%	4	0.67%	16	0.67%
MERU	1,473	3.60%	702,480	3.58%	22	3.67%	88	3.67%
MIGORI	826	2.02%	388,633	1.98%	12	2.00%	48	2.00%
MOMBASA	934	2.28%	580,223	2.96%	17	2.83%	68	2.83%
MURANG'A	1,131	2.77%	587,126	3.00%	17	2.83%	68	2.83%
NAIROBI CITY	3,378	8.26%	2,250,853	11.48%	68	11.33%	272	11.33%
NAKURU	1,806	4.42%	949,618	4.84%	28	4.67%	112	4.67%
NANDI	796	1.95%	346,007	1.77%	11	1.83%	44	1.83%
NAROK	750	1.83%	341,730	1.74%	11	1.83%	44	1.83%
NYAMIRA	553	1.35%	278,853	1.42%	9	1.50%	36	1.50%
NYANDARUA	654	1.60%	335,634	1.71%	10	1.67%	40	1.67%
NYERI	917	2.24%	456,949	2.33%	13	2.17%	52	2.17%
SAMBURU	284	0.69%	82,787	0.42%	3	0.50%	12	0.50%
SIAYA	916	2.24%	457,953	2.34%	13	2.17%	52	2.17%
TAITA TAVETA	354	0.87%	155,716	0.79%	5	0.83%	20	0.83%
TANA RIVER	307	0.75%	118,327	0.60%	4	0.67%	16	0.67%
THARAKA - NITHI	625	1.53%	213,154	1.09%	7	1.17%	28	1.17%
TRANS NZOIA	639	1.56%	339,622	1.73%	11	1.83%	44	1.83%
TURKANA	644	1.58%	191,435	0.98%	6	1.00%	24	1.00%
UASIN GISHU	868	2.12%	450,055	2.30%	13	2.17%	52	2.17%
VIHIGA	548	1.34%	272,409	1.39%	8	1.33%	32	1.33%
WAJIR	434	1.06%	162,902	0.83%	5	0.83%	20	0.83%
WEST POKOT	712	1.74%	180,232	0.92%	6	1.00%	24	1.00%
	<b>40,770</b>		<b>19,601,502</b>		<b>600</b>		<b>2,400</b>	

Table 4.1 above shows the representativeness of the VLA sample by County. For example, 1.18% (232,258) of the registered voters in the country are in Baringo, and in the ELOG VLA sample, 1.17% (28) of all respondents were drawn from the same county. Moreover, 1.64% (322,012) of the registered voters are in Bomet County while 1.67% (40) of ELOG respondents were from the same county. The same representation is shown for each of the 47 Counties.

### 4.3. VLA Field Test Response Rate


**Table 4.2:** VLA Field Survey (People -to- List) Response Rate

COUNTY_NAME	Expected Respondents	Successful Interviews	Response Rate
BOMET	40	40	100%
BUSIA	44	44	100%
EMBU	40	40	100%
GARISSA	20	20	100%
HOMA BAY	60	60	100%
KAJIADO	52	52	100%
KERICHO	48	48	100%
KIAMBU	140	140	100%
KIRINYAGA	44	44	100%
KISII	64	64	100%
KISUMU	64	64	100%
KWALE	36	36	100%
LAIKIPIA	32	32	100%
LAMU	12	12	100%
MACHAKOS	72	72	100%
MANDERA	24	24	100%
MERU	88	88	100%
MIGORI	48	48	100%
NAKURU	112	112	100%
NANDI	44	44	100%
NYAMIRA	36	36	100%
NYANDARUA	40	40	100%
NYERI	52	52	100%
SAMBURU	12	12	100%

COUNTY_NAME	Expected Respondents	Successful Interviews	Response Rate
SIAYA	52	52	100%
TAITA TAVETA	20	20	100%
TANA RIVER	16	16	100%
TRANS NZOIA	44	44	100%
VIHIGA	32	32	100%
MURANG'A	68	66	97%
NAIROBI CITY	272	264	97%
MAKUENI	52	50	96%
KAKAMEGA	88	84	95%
BUNGOMA	68	64	94%
NAROK	44	40	91%
KITUI	60	52	87%
THARAKA – NITHI	28	24	86%
UASIN GISHU	52	44	85%
ELGEYO/MARAKWET	24	20	83%
BARINGO	28	23	82%
MOMBASA	68	56	82%
KILIFI	64	49	77%
MARSABIT	16	12	75%
TURKANA	24	16	67%
WEST POKOT	24	16	67%
WAJIR	20	12	60%
ISIOLO	12	0	0%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,400</b>	<b>2,280</b>	<b>95%</b>

Table 4.2 presents the VLA field test response rate. The response rate was 95%. This was due to various reasons such as poor weather conditions during the fieldwork exercise, which affected mostly Isiolo County, and to some extent Tana River, and Kilifi counties. Other factors that hampered VLA fieldwork included insecurity and hostile respondents and residents in counties such as Baringo, Mombasa and Nairobi. Poor road network and transportation challenges affected the conduct of interviews in Wajir and parts of Eastern region. It is important to note that failure to conduct 5% of planned interviews did not affect significantly the findings of the VLA field survey.

#### 4.4. Gender of the VLA Respondents



#### N=2,280 (People-to-list Respondents) - Verifying Information of Eligible Voters to the 2017 RoV

Out of the 2,280 interviews conducted 1,180 (52%) were from male respondents while 1,100 (48%) were from Female respondents. ELOG had planned to have a 50:50 ratio of male to female respondents. Based on the response rate it seems male respondents were more available and willing to be interviewed than female. However, this did not significantly affect the field test survey, as ELOG was able to collect information about voter registration from both genders.

#### 4.5. Registration Status of the Respondents





Figure 4.5: Registration Status of the Respondents

Out of the 2,280 respondents interviewed, 2,150 (94%) indicated that they were registered while 130 (6%) indicated that they were not. When the 130 respondents were asked why they were not registered, they cited various reasons as depicted in Figure 14.17. The statistics reveal that the main reason why one is not able to register is due to Lack of National Identity card or passport accounting for 56%, followed by lack of interest (12%).

#### 4.6. Reasons for not registering as a Voter




**Figure 4.6:** Reasons for not registering as a Voter

Most of the respondents (56%) did not have an ID/Passport hence did not even attempt to register, 12% indicated they were not interested at all in the electoral matters, 10% were either sick or disabled, 8% felt the registration time was too short hence they did not make it to the polling stations.

These were people who were far from home (such as school, those who had travelled, or work related), 7% did not live at the area, 3% felt that the registration process was too complex, 3% were not aware of the process while 1% did not attempt to register as they felt there was no financial or material benefit attached to registration.


#### 4.7. Place for Registration



**Figure 4.7:** Place of Registration

Majority of the respondents accounting for 96% indicated that they registered at the registration centre, 3% registered at their homes, while 1% registered at their places of worship such as a church or a mosque.

#### 4.8. Documents used to Register




**Figure 4.8:** Document used for Voter Registration

Out of the 2,150 respondents who indicated that they were registered majority 2,129 (99%) used National Identity card to register while only 13 (0.6%) used passport despite having 1,291,576<sup>33</sup> Kenyans having passports as 13th April 2017. These statistics closely matches with the computer test analysis, which indicated that 99.5% of the registered voters used the national ID and 0.4% used their passports. The findings also correspond with the IED's 2013 audit report which revealed that 99% of eligible Kenyans used the National Identification Card to register compared to only 0.8% who used a passport<sup>34</sup>. The report recommended that Kenyans who become of age should be facilitated to acquire ID cards to avoid being disenfranchised. Also document that are required for ID application need to be reviewed to enable those who are not able to get their fathers ID Card to apply for IDs.

Regulation 69 of the Elections (General) Regulations, 2011 requires a voter to produce an identification document that he /she used at the time of registration as a voter to be allowed to vote. ELOG noted that the regulations are silent on the issue of expired passport as identification document during voting.

#### 4.9 Challenges experienced during voter registration



**Figure 4.9:** Challenges faced during Voter Registration


88% of the respondents felt that the registration process was simple and easy and hence they did not experience any hiccups during the registration. 12% had few

<sup>33</sup> See KPMG Report

<sup>34</sup> Refer to IED 2013 audit report, p. 26

reservations, as shown in the figure 4.9. Other challenges included registration period being too short, not aware of the BVR kit movement, far distances to the polling centres, kit failed to function properly, registration process taking too much time and the process being complicated.


#### 4.10: Inspection of the RoV



**Figure 4. 10:** Inspection of RoV

Inspection of the voters' register is a key component during the preparation and finalization of the official voters roll that would be used during the elections. As such the IEBC opened the register for inspection from May 09<sup>th</sup> to June 09<sup>th</sup> 2017. Analysis showed that 75% of the respondents in the people to list test turned up for the inspection exercise while 25% did not.


This is the period that the errors in registration are normally identified and addressed. Among the voters that verified their details, 85% visited their registered polling Centres where the voters' roll was available. 13% used the IEBC's SMS number while 1% used the IEBC's portal. With 1% using other methods such as the visiting Huduma centres to verify or visiting IEBC constituency offices. Among the respondents who verified their details, 8% amended their details mainly on their names, the ID / Passport number, the gender and a few cases of the polling centre being wrongly captured.



**Figure 4.11:** Reasons for not Verifying Details in the Register

For the respondents who failed to verify their details, they cited varied reasons. Some of the reasons included believing that they were automatically in the voter's register (49%), were not aware of the verification exercise (15%), were busy/ away from home (15%), they had moved away or were transferred from their polling centres (9%), too old/disabled (5%)

#### 4.11. Main Source of Information on Voter Registration




**Figure 4. 12:** Main source of information on Voter Registration

Majority of the respondents (49%) had the broadcast media as their source of information on the voter's register. The broadcast media includes radio and TV. They reported watching or hearing the IEBC voter education on these media, the religious institutions (church or mosque) were second highest with 12% while the least were from NGOs/CBOs.

#### 4.12. National Voter Registration Rate<sup>35</sup>

According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) as quoted by the KPMG in its audit report, there were approximately 25, 215,055<sup>36</sup> eligible voters for the 2017 general elections who in an ideal situation or if voter registration in Kenya was mandatory should have been identified by the IEBC and their details captured in the 2017 RoV to enable them participate in the 8<sup>th</sup> August 2017 General Elections. However, since voter registration in Kenya is voluntary, IEBC's managed to register 19,607,030<sup>37</sup> voters within Kenya. This accounts for a National Voter Registration Rate (NVRR) of 78% as presented in the Figure 4.13 below.



**Figure 4.13:** National Voter Registration Rate


The VLA survey revealed that the national voter registration rate increased from 68%<sup>38</sup> during the 2013 General elections to 78% during the August 8<sup>th</sup> 2017 general elections. This is an increase of about 10%. Since 2010, the National Voter Registration Rate (NVRR)<sup>39</sup> has been increasing tremendously from 57% in 2010, 68% in 2013 and 78% in 2017. This finding corresponds with the KPMG audit report

<sup>35</sup> Percentage of all eligible voters against those who are actually registered

<sup>36</sup> See KPMG RoV Audit Report, p. 54

<sup>37</sup> This figure excludes diaspora registration statistics which was 4,393

that found out that National Registration rate was 77.93%<sup>40</sup>. Computed against the 25,323,059 (number of ID cards that were issued by the Registrar of persons under the National Registration Bureau (NRB) by 15<sup>th</sup> May 2017) the National voter registration rate was 77%.



**Figure 4.14:** Comparative National Voter Registration Rates Since 2010

The increase in the National voter registration rates is an indication that majority of Kenyans are aware of their sovereign power as provided in Article one of the Constitution which they exercise by first registering as voters and subsequently by voting. The increase can also be attributed to a number of factors such as improved strategies to reach out to the potential voters. On the other hand, the VLA revealed that 23% of eligible citizens do not exercise their sovereign power by not registering as voters despite being qualified to do so. This finding corresponds with that of KPMG audit report, which found out that not all the people embrace the sovereign power as provided in the Constitution. This can be attributed to some degree of voter apathy amongst qualified citizens and unsatisfactory performance of some elected leaders.

#### 4.13. Progressive Diaspora Voter Registration Coverage

Article 82 (1)(e) of the Constitution of Kenya (CoK) provides for progressive registration and realization of voting rights for citizens residing outside Kenya.

<sup>38</sup> See IED 2013 RoV Audit Report, p. 32

<sup>39</sup> This is the percentage of approximate population aged 18 years and above who actually registered and their details are in the RoV

<sup>40</sup> See KPMG Audit report, p.164

Kenya Diaspora right to vote was accorded to them for the first time in 2013 where 2,637 citizens living in Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda were registered.

According to the Kenya Diaspora Alliance (KDA)<sup>41</sup>, 10 % of eligible voters reside outside Kenya<sup>42</sup>. When computed against the National eligible voters of 25, 215,055 the indication is that there were approximately 2,521,506 eligible citizens in the diaspora for the 2017 general elections. In its endeavor to franchise the eligible citizens in the diaspora for the 2017 general elections, IEBC conducted voter registration in five countries namely; Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa from 20th February to 6th March 2017 in the Embassies / High Commission and Consulate realizing a total of 4,393 diaspora voters. This accounted for diaspora registration coverage of 2% as depicted in the Figure 4.4 below.




**Figure 4.15:** Progressive Diaspora Voter Registration Coverage

ELOG VLA revealed that despite an increase of 40% of those registered (from 2,637 in 2013 to 4,393), the registration coverage for citizens living outside the country remains very low at 2%. It is important to note that these computations are based on approximate diaspora statistics since there is no official census data on citizens in the diaspora.

<sup>41</sup> A federation of over 40 Diaspora organizations with a combined membership of about 250,000 Kenyans across the globe

<sup>42</sup> See KDA submission report to Joint Select Parliament Committee (JSPC) dated 22nd July 2016




**Figure 4.16:** Comparative Analysis of 2017 Diaspora Registration by Country

Figure 4.16 shows that Tanzania recorded the highest number of diaspora registered voters accounting for 1,377 (31%), followed by Uganda 1,184 (27%), Rwanda 875 (20%), South Africa 783 (18%) and Burundi 164 (4%). The statistics on diaspora registration posits a clear indication that the pace at which the country is progressively realizing the diaspora right to vote is very slow.

This slow pace has been attributed to a number of factors such as lack of political good will, non-registration of Kenyans with Embassies / High Commission or consulates<sup>43</sup>, lack of official census data on citizens in the diaspora, lack of diaspora representation in parliament, different time zones, inadequate voter education for diaspora, logistical and operational challenges, inadequate financial resources, legal requirement that one has to vote in person, lack of an international policy to guide the coordination of electoral activities in host countries and inadequate policy on diaspora voter registration and voting.


<sup>43</sup> Kenya Diaspora Database as at July 2015 showed that out of 805,980 estimated Kenya Population in 36 Countries only 106,501 registered with the Embassies. This accounts for 13% only.

#### 4.14. Comparison of Male and Female Registration Rates



**Figure 4.17:** Comparison of Male and Female Registration Rates

Out of the 25, 215,055 eligible voters in 2017 as provided by KNBS, it could be inferred that 51% accounting for 12,859,678 were female while 49% accounting for 12,355,377 were male. This is an indication that female eligible voters were more than male eligible voters by 2% (501,301). The VLA found out that despite female eligible voters being more than male by 2%, their registration rate is 5% lower than that of male. This finding corresponds with all the three audit reports of 2010, 2013 and KPMG audit report. The 2010 audit report found out that women representation was 2% lower than that of men, while the 2013 audit revealed that it was 6% lower. The KPMG report also found out that women are underrepresented compared to KNBS and NRB population ratio<sup>44</sup>.



**Figure 4.18:** Ratio of Female to Male Registration Statistics in the 2017 RoV

<sup>44</sup> Refer to KPMG Audit report, p. 170

Out of the 19,611,423 records in the 2017 RoV, 50.61 % were male while 49.39% were female despite having more women eligible voters. The under representation of women in voter registration and in electoral processes in general has been attributed to a number of factors such as socio-cultural practices, gender-based violence, harsh political environment, low media attention to women aspirants to highlight their leadership style and achievements, insecurity, inadequate civic/ voter education and lack of ID cards particularly among women who got married without parent's consent or those who are raised by single mothers.

**Table 4.3: Ratio of Voter Registration by Gender and by County**

NO.	COUNTY	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL REGISTERED
1	BARINGO	115,819	116,439	232,258
2	BOMET	163,828	158,184	322,012
3	BUNGOMA	284,016	275,834	559,850
4	BUSIA	170,371	180,677	351,048
5	DIASPORA	2,770	1,623	4,393
6	ELGEYO/MARAKWET	92,180	88,484	180,664
7	EMBU	155,627	153,841	309,468
8	GARISSA	85,991	77,359	163,350
9	HOMA BAY	221,629	255,246	476,875
10	ISIOLO	38,383	36,955	75,338
11	KAJIADO	214,425	196,768	411,193
12	KAKAMEGA	365,410	378,326	743,736
13	KERICHO	193,728	181,940	375,668
14	KIAMBU	585,635	595,285	1,180,920
15	KILIFI	239,982	268,086	508,068
16	KIRINYAGA	175,645	174,191	349,836
17	KISII	271,226	275,354	546,580
18	KISUMU	265,227	273,983	539,210
19	KITUI	224,299	250,213	474,512
20	KWALE	135,165	145,876	281,041
21	LAIKIPIA	126,053	120,434	246,487
22	LAMU	37,511	32,265	69,776


NO.	COUNTY	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL REGISTERED
23	MACHAKOS	318,655	301,599	620,254
24	MAKUENI	211,362	211,948	423,310
25	MANDERA	90,335	85,307	175,642
26	MARSABIT	72,143	69,565	141,708
27	MERU	355,712	346,768	702,480
28	MIGORI	186,918	201,715	388,633
29	MOMBASA	325,085	255,138	580,223
30	MURANG'A	291,274	295,852	587,126
31	NAIROBI CITY	1,243,245	1,007,608	2,250,853
32	NAKURU	486,268	463,350	949,618
33	NANDI	178,402	167,605	346,007
34	NAROK	175,407	166,323	341,730
35	NYAMIRA	139,646	139,207	278,853
36	NYANDARUA	166,179	169,455	335,634
37	NYERI	225,749	231,200	456,949
38	PRISONS	5,216	312	5,528
39	SAMBURU	37,712	45,075	82,787
40	SIAYA	210,747	247,206	457,953
41	TAITA TAVETA	81,287	74,429	155,716
42	TANA RIVER	57,976	60,351	118,327
43	THARAKA - NITHI	106,800	106,354	213,154
44	TRANS NZOIA	177,263	162,359	339,622
45	TURKANA	81,280	110,155	191,435
46	UASIN GISHU	234,157	215,898	450,055
47	VIHIGA	128,720	143,689	272,409
48	WAJIR	85,525	77,377	162,902
49	WEST POKOT	87,313	92,919	180,232
	<b>Total</b>	<b>9,925,296</b>	<b>9,686,127</b>	<b>19,611,423</b>

### Counties with More Registered Women than Men

There were 21 Counties with More Registered Women than Men as depicted in Figure 7 below.




Figure 4.19: Counties with More Registered Women than Men



The VLA noted that these counties recorded the same trend of registering more women than men as it was observed during the Constitutional Referendum and in


2013 general elections. Also, most of these counties are in rural areas. It would be important that further research is undertaken to establish why women continue to register in large numbers in these counties. The findings from such a research should inform strategies to reach out to women in other counties.

#### 4.15. National Youth Registration Rate



**Figure 4.20:** National Youth Registration Rate in 2017

Youth eligible voters constitute 45.55%<sup>45</sup> of 25,215,055. This percentage accounts for 11,485,458 youth<sup>46</sup>. Statistics in the 2017 RoV indicates that 9,530,239 youth were registered accounting for 83% registration rate for the youth. This shows a tremendous increase of youth registration rate compared to 2013. In 2013 National youth registration rate was 57%.




**Figure 4.21:** Ratio of Youth to Non-Youth in the 2017 Register of Voters

<sup>44</sup> Refer to KPMG report, p. 175

<sup>44</sup> Means collectivity of all individuals in the Republic of Kenya who have attained the age of Eighteen years but have not attained the age of thirty - five years as provided under Article 260 of CoK

Youth constituted 48.6% of the registered voters in the 2017 RoV. This was an increased youth registration from 2013 where youth constituted 48% of the registered voters. This accounts for a 0.6% increase. In 2013, 6,942,253 youth were registered while in 2017, 9,530,239 youth were registered therefore 2,587,986 more youth were registered in 2017. These statistics are depicted in figure 4.22.




**Figure 4.22:** Comparative Analysis of Youth Registration in 2013 and 2017

**Table 4.4:** County Ratios of Youth and Non-Youth in the 2017 RoV

County	Non-Youth	Youth	% Youth Registration	Total
MANDERA	72,048	103,594	59	175,642
NAIROBI CITY	960,173	1,290,680	57	2,250,853
GARISSA	73,057	90,293	55	163,350
WAJIR	73,574	89,328	55	162,902
KISUMU	245,656	293,554	54	539,210
MOMBASA	265,275	314,948	54	580,223
KAJIADO	189,312	221,881	54	411,193
WEST POKOT	85,473	94,759	53	180,232
MIGORI	184,428	204,205	53	388,633
HOMA BAY	227,950	248,925	52	476,875
NAROK	164,544	177,186	52	341,730
UASIN GISHU	216,730	233,325	52	450,055
MARSABIT	69,296	72,412	51	141,708
KERICHO	183,722	191,946	51	375,668
NAKURU	465,676	483,942	51	949,618

County	Non-Youth	Youth	% Youth Registration	Total
SAMBURU	41,193	41,594	50	82,787
KIAMBU	591,450	589,470	50	1,180,920
BOMET	161,296	160,716	50	322,012
BARINGO	116,473	115,785	50	232,258
ELGEYO/MARAKWET	90,645	90,019	50	180,664
TANA RIVER	59,373	58,954	50	118,327
NANDI	174,966	171,041	49	346,007
ISIOLO	38,237	37,101	49	75,338
BUNGOMA	287,870	271,980	49	559,850
BUSIA	182,143	168,905	48	351,048
KILIFI	264,424	243,644	48	508,068
SIAYA	239,305	218,648	48	457,953
KISII	286,017	260,563	48	546,580
TRANS NZOIA	179,861	159,761	47	339,622
PRISONS	2,932	2,596	47	5,528
LAMU	37,437	32,339	46	69,776
NYAMIRA	151,248	127,605	46	278,853
KWALE	152,583	128,458	46	281,041
LAIKIPIA	134,363	112,124	45	246,487
KAKAMEGA	407,180	336,556	45	743,736
MERU	392,955	309,525	44	702,480
TURKANA	107,988	83,447	44	191,435
NYANDARUA	191,354	144,280	43	335,634
MACHAKOS	357,574	262,680	42	620,254
THARAKA – NITHI	123,203	89,951	42	213,154
EMBU	179,988	129,480	42	309,468
TAITA TAVETA	90,774	64,942	42	155,716
KITUI	283,703	190,809	40	474,512
VIHIGA	164,452	107,957	40	272,409
KIRINYAGA	211,828	138,008	39	349,836
NYERI	278,110	178,839	39	456,949
MAKUENI	258,449	164,861	39	423,310
MURANG'A	362,036	225,090	38	587,126
DIASPORA	2,860	1,533	35	4,393

Table 4.4 shows a comparison of registered youths to non-youth from 2017 RoV by County. Analysis shows that there were 16 Counties where youth registration was more than Non-youth. The top seven Counties with the highest numbers of youth are Mandera (59%), Nairobi City (57%) and Garissa (55%), Wajir (55%), Kisumu (54%), Mombasa (54%) and Kajiado (54%). On the other hand, Counties with the lowest youth registered are Vihiga (40%), Kirinyaga (39%), Nyeri (39%), Makueni (39%) and Muranga (38%).









Figure 4.23: Top Ten Counties with highest number of Youth Registered







**Figure 4.24:** Counties with the Highest Female Youth Registered

**Table 4.5: Counties with the Highest Number of Female Youth Registration**


County	Registered Voters	Youth	Female Youth	Male Youth	% Female Youth	% male Youth
KIAMBU	1,180,920	589,470	298,520	290,950	50.64%	49.36%
KISUMU	539,210	293,554	149,012	144,542	50.76%	49.24%
KISII	546,580	260,563	130,873	129,690	50.23%	49.77%
HOMA BAY	476,875	248,925	130,227	118,698	52.32%	47.68%
KILIFI	508,068	243,644	126,391	117,253	51.88%	48.12%
SIAYA	457,953	218,648	113,085	105,563	51.72%	48.28%
MIGORI	388,633	204,205	103,551	100,654	50.71%	49.29%
KWALE	281,041	128,458	67,846	60,612	52.82%	47.18%
NYAMIRA	278,853	127,605	64,631	62,974	50.65%	49.35%
VIHIGA	272,409	107,957	54,575	53,382	50.55%	49.45%
WEST POKOT	180,232	94,759	47,867	46,892	50.51%	49.49%
TURKANA	191,435	83,447	46,883	36,564	56.18%	43.82%
TANA RIVER	118,327	58,954	30,972	27,982	52.54%	47.46%
SAMBURU	82,787	41,594	23,523	18,071	56.55%	43.45%

Analysis shows that the top 5 Counties with the highest ratio of female youth registered are Samburu, Turkana, Kwale Tana River and Homabay Counties respectively. Analysis of youth between 18 - 25 years Old showed that there were large numbers of registered youth between the ages of 18 -25-year old's in Nairobi City, Kiambu and Nakuru counties. However, when ranking the performance of this age bracket as a ratio of the total youth registered in the respective counties Mandera county had the highest ratio of the registered youth between 18 -25 years followed by Homabay and Garissa counties.






#### 4.16. Voter Registration Totals by Age Band



**Figure 4.25** Voter Registration Ratios by Age

Figure 4.25 shows that the age bracket of 25 to 29 years has the highest number of registered voters with 3,185,530 (16.2%). This is followed by the age bracket of 20-24 with 2,928,959 (14.9%) and Age 30-34 with 2,919,112 (14.9%) voters. The lowest registration was between the age brackets of 18-19 years old. This finding corresponds with that of KMPM report that found out that voter registration amongst the 18-19-year old's is significantly low at (1.05%) of the total registered voters, for a population that makes up (8.19%)<sup>47</sup> of the eligible voters. In addition, the number of IDs issued to this age group is only (1.99%) of the total number of issued IDs.



#### 4.17. Analysis of Errors in 2017 RoV

##### 4.17.1. Data Formatting and Consistency

When data was exported from the IEBC Server it was shared with ELOG in the form of Comma Separated Values (CSV<sup>48</sup>) format, which means that Columns in the data file are separated by the Comma symbol. This therefore means that during data capture if a Comma is introduced in the name or any other variable then during data export the piece of information separated by the comma will be parsed into the next column and as a result pushing all the other data into the next Column. There were 23,440 records that had data shifted due to presence of commas in the variables. Most of the data that was truncated was found to be in the polling station variable and the Primary and secondary Names Variables. There were 22,237 records that had the polling station name variable truncated while the records whose names had been truncated were 1,203. The list showing

<sup>47</sup> See KPMG Report, p. 51

<sup>48</sup> CSV is a type of data format in which each piece of data is separated by a comma. This is a popular format for transferring data from one application to another, because most database systems are able to import and export comma-delimited data.

commas that were introduced during data capture and truncated details have been shared with the IEBC for action.

#### 4.17.2. Analysis of Clerical Mistakes in the ID Number / Passport Field

There were 19,611,422 records in the Register that had an ID Number or Passport number in the ID Number Field. This therefore means there was one record missing the ID or Passport<sup>49</sup>. This finding corresponds with KPMG report finding. In addition, there were 2,186 records with clerical mistakes in the ID or passport numbers. Some examples of the errors include ID records containing Non-Numeric characters only and the letter 'O' instead of the Number zero '0'.




Figure 4.26: Analysis of Clerical Errors in ID/Passport Number

#### 4.17.3. Determination of the Number of Characters in the passport Number




Figure 4.27: Analysis of the Number of Characters in the Passport

<sup>49</sup> See KPMG Report, p.35

Analysis of the number of characters in the passport number with the following alphabets

Letters A, B, C, D and K was undertaken. ELOG noted there were 70,695 such records. With regard to the length of the passport, the character lengths ranged between 2 and 15 with majority ranging between 7 and 8 characters. The standard length of a passport number should range between 7 to 8 characters. This therefore means that characters in the passport length that are less than 7 and more than 8 portray errors during the data capture which the BVR Kit could not detect.

#### **4.17.4. Determination of the Number of Characters in the ID Card Number**

There were 19,538,238 records that resembled an ID card due to the presence of Numeric Characters Only in the ID/ Passport Field. However, Just Like the Passport analysis, the Lengths of the Characters ranged between 1 character and 15 characters. As with the passport records, there would be need to compare the ID that matched all the criteria of a proper Kenyan ID against certified data from the National Registration Bureau to verify the validity and accuracy of these ID Numbers.

#### **4.17. 5. IDs/Passport with Improper Format**

There were 2,186 records that did not have a proper format of either an ID Number or a Passport. This was determined by records having non- numeric characters thus not passing for ID Numbers and those that had alphanumeric characters but not conforming to the Standard manner in which Kenyan Passports appear. Examples include having names in the column of ID or Passport Number, having number such as KE009223EDWA, A1757227A and many other number numbers that do not qualify to be ID or passport number. A list of all the ID and Passport numbers that were wrongly formatted were shared with the commission for investigation and action.

#### **4.17.6. Use of Letter 'O' instead of Numeric Zero '0'**

There were 1, 618 records that contained alphabet characters preceded by numeric characters. Most of these records had the letter "O" used in the place of Numeric character zero "0". This might look like a negligible error but it may lead to a voter not being identified especially if the biometrics fail and the voter have to be identified using the ID Number. This therefore means the ID Number being

searched will not match with the one stored because of one or two digits that are not properly Recorded as numeric letter zero “0”

#### 4.17.7. Records where there were letters only in the ID/Passport field

There were 568 records where the ID/Passport fields contained names (Letters Only) and not Numeric ID Numbers or the Alpha Numeric Passports. It is important to note that the above clerical errors in the formatting, number of characters in the passport or ID number, use of alphabet ‘O’ instead of 0 are clear indications of errors that are introduced during the data capture.

#### 4.17.8. Analysis of Date, day and Year of Birth Field



**Figure 4.28:** Analysis of Day, Date and Year of Birth


In analyzing the Date, day and year of birth records, it was noted that the Day and Month Records were consistent as expected i.e. Day values ranged between 1 and 31 while the Month values ranged between 1 and 12. However, this was not the case for the Year Values. The minimum year value was 1074, which is an error indicating that the oldest person in the register is 943 Years old while the Maximum Year was 1999 indicating that the Youngest Person was 18 Years old as at the Last day of Registration of Voters.

**Table 4.6:** Distribution of the Year of Birth Between 1800 and 1899

Year Band	Frequency	Frequency
1850 -1859	124	9.30
1860 - 1869	48	3.60
1870 - 1879	210	15.75
1880 - 1889	677	50.79
1890 - 1899	274	20.56
	<b>1,333</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Table 4.6 shows the distribution of records with year in the date of Birth that is between 1800 and 1899. There were 1,333 records whose year of birth fell within this range. These Errors depict clerical mistakes during Voter registration, which can be avoided if there are thorough logical controls in the data capture system.

#### 4.17.9. Analysis of the Primary and Secondary Names Fields




**Figure 4.29** Primary Name Analysis

The register of Voters shared had two name fields i.e. the Primary and Secondary Name Columns. There was no standard way of recording the names in the two columns. There are records that had more than one name in the primary name while others only had one name in the Primary Name column. Same case applied for the Secondary Name Column. Out of the 19,611,423 Records there were 29 records missing Primary Name. Out of these 8 only had one name, which appeared in the secondary Name column. The remaining 21 records had their corresponding records shifted to the next column and as a result having mis-aligned records and blank primary name field.


With regard to missing Secondary Names ELOG noted that out of the 19,611,423 records there were 57 records missing secondary names. Out of these 3 only had the primary Name, two of which had two names in the primary name column. While the remaining 21 records had their corresponding records shifted to the next column and as a result having mis-aligned records and blank primary name field.

#### 4.17.10. Numeric characters in Names

There were 4,734 records that had numeric characters in the primary Name Field. On the other hand, there were 11,388 records that had numeric characters in the secondary name field. Most of these records had the Character Zero "0" instead of the letter "O".




**Figure 4.30:** Analysis of Numeric Numbers in Primary Name



**Figure 4.31:** Analysis of Numeric Numbers in Secondary Name

There were 48 records where both primary name and secondary names contained Numeric Characters Only. There were 730 records where at least one name either the Primary Name or the Secondary Name contains numeric characters only. These findings correspond with what KPMG audit report revealed that the RoV had 171,476 voter records without matching ID numbers and 17,523 voter records without matching passport numbers when compared to records submitted by NRB and Department of Immigration Services (DIS).

#### 4.17.11 Voter Records with the same Identity Number



**Figure 4.32** Voter Records with the same Identity Number

When the variable containing ID/ Passport Numbers was analyzed ELOG found that there were a total 169,646 duplicate records in the 2017 RoV. This finding closely corresponds with KPMG findings of 197,677 duplicated records.

#### 4.17.12. Records of dead voters in the 2017 RoV

ELOG was not able to determine the number of deceased voters in the register since there was no official list of dead voters that was provided by the Registrar of Births and deaths. The lack of this external data made it impossible for ELOG to determine how many dead voters are in the 2017 RoV. However, ELOG would like to concur with the KPMG findings and recommendations that the removal of deceased voters from the register presents the biggest challenge for the commission. This is because there is no central electronic list of the number of deceased voters in the country kept by CRS. Even if such a register is available it is not accurate since in many instances the records lack ID or passport numbers of the deceased person and includes details of the person reporting the death case<sup>1</sup>. In addition, most of the death cases are never reported and documented. Also, there are incomplete details of deceased person in the list of deceased voters such lack of ID card or passport number and lack of Date of birth that would be used to identify deceased voters in the register hence making it very difficult to remove the deceased voters from the register. In fact, KPMG report concluded that there could be 1,037,260 deceased persons in the 2017 RoV and that the process of removing dead voters in the register is ineffective.

<sup>50</sup> Refer KPMG Report. p. 38

## CHAPTER 5

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1. VLA Summary

Having assessed the 2017 Register of Voters ELOG is of the opinion that despite the KMPG report having been shared with IEBC in May, 2017 (three months to elections), little was done to address the errors and other inconsistencies in the register before the elections. This is because ELOG's RoV audit, which was done post 8th August 2017 elections, still reveals the presence of errors in the register. However, ELOG is of the view that most of the errors in the register are introduced during the data capture stage when voters are being registered. The main reason for this is capacity of BVR kit to detect these errors immediately they are introduced in the system. Most of these errors can be avoided if the data capture process can be enhanced by reviewing the data capture system in the BVR Kits and ensuring high level of professional and standardized trainings of the voter registration clerks.

#### 5.2. VLA Conclusions

Based on the VLA findings, ELOG concludes that the amount of errors in the 2017 RoV are not very significant to warrant nullification of the register. All records that were found with errors have been shared with the Commission. Therefore, the Commission should be able to address all those errors to enhance the accuracy of the register. The IEBC should show evidence on how these errors have been addressed before the register is used in any referendum / elections. This conclusion has been made based on the assumption that there are not voters' registers in the world that are 100% accurate. However effective measures should be put in place to ensure that most if not all of the records in the register are accurate.

In addition, ELOG concludes by noting that identification of voters by use of biometrics should be maintained and enhanced. IEBC should use any of the biometric features of the voter that was captured during voter registration to identify a voter during voting. This conclusion is being made in the recognition of the challenges that the Commission experiences in deleting deceased voters from the register as well as challenges faced by voters whose finger prints cannot be read by finger print scanner.

### 5.3. VLA Recommendations

#### A). Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

1. Just like voter registration is continuous, IEBC should partner with the relevant stakeholders to provide targeted continuous civic/voter education to citizens. It is believed that effective voter education can help address the issue of voter apathy among eligible voters.
2. Review of the Diaspora policy should take into cognizance the context in which citizens in the diaspora operates to inform the diaspora voter registration and voting procedures.
3. Once diaspora census data is available, IEBC should use the data to inform the establishment of temporary / mobile polling centres where there are high concentrations of the Diaspora in respective countries.
4. IEBC to strengthen collaboration with electoral stakeholders to develop effective and efficient online platforms for diaspora voter education.
5. The IEBC institutionalizes community sensitization fora in their voter education strategies to reach out to men and other stakeholders with an aim of influencing them to change their attitude towards women leadership. This will ensure that men support women in their desire to participate in electoral processes either as a voter or a candidate.
6. IEBC to partners with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) and other credible organization to implement targeted voter education for women.
7. IEBC to continue and strengthen the use technological platforms such as twitter, Facebook, Instagram and infotainment strategies to reach out to young women voters with voter education messages.
8. IEBC in collaboration with the relevant stakeholders to implement youth friendly outreach strategies such as use of interactive online tools such as Facebook, twitter, blogs use of infotainment and edutainment voter education strategies.
9. To continue with the location of registration centres in institutions of learning such as universities and Colleges in order to reach out to youthful voters.

10. IEBC implements targeted and continuous Voter education. There is need for continuous funding of civic and voter education by both the Government and Development partners. Advocacy on this should start now.
11. IEBC to enhance voter registration in hospitals
12. That the IEBC ensures that registration centres are accessible to all eligible voters and especially the persons with disability. IEBC should also capture comprehensive data on PWDs including the type of disability so that can be used for adequate planning and budgeting.
13. There should be a clear plan for BVR kit movement within the constituencies, wards churches and mosques to ensure majority of the eligible voters are facilitated to register.
14. That the Elections Act, 2011 and the Elections (General) Regulations 2011 be amended to clearly provide that one cannot vote using an expired passport.
15. The electoral technology especially BVR to be configured to detect passport expiry date during voter identification process.
16. IEBC to continue with the strategy of availing the voters' register at the polling centres since majority of voters prefer visiting these centres to verify their details.
17. Voter education on the importance of inspecting the RoV should be enhanced. Feedback should be provided on whether the issues raised have been addressed
18. IEBC continue and strengthen the use of local FM radios and TV to disseminate voter education messages. The commission should also strengthen the use of social media platform to reach out to the youth voters and Kenyans in the diaspora.
19. The Commission investigates all the records that have wrong ID or passport format.

20. The commission builds a mechanism for comparative analysis of ID or Passport numbers captured by BVR Kit during voter registration process with those held by NRB and ministry of Foreign Affairs.
21. The Commission builds in a BVR data capture system that can detect errors during data capture. For example, if a voter registration clerk types in a name in the column of ID/Passport number, the BVR data capture system should be able to detect this. The system should also be able to detect double/ multiple registrations at the data capture stage.
22. IEBC to enhance the use of biometrics to identify voters during voting.
23. IEBC in collaboration with all electoral actors to develop a removal of dead voters from the RoV Policy to guide the process of cleaning the register. IEBC should also document the challenges it faces in dealing with dead voters

#### **B). National Registration Bureau**

1. NRB should also come up with strategies of ensuring that those coming age are adequately facilitated to acquire ID cards. NRB should also establish mechanism of notifying those who have applied for the ID card when the cards are ready for collection.
2. That the National Registration Bureau simplifies and shortens the time for acquisition of ID cards.
3. Should strengthen the strategy of issuing ID cards to high school students who have attained the age of 18 years.

#### **C). Registrar of Births and Deaths**

1. That all state departments with data and information that is pertinent to voter registration and compilation of an accurate register be compelled to share the data with the commission to support the actualization of Article 35 of the Constitution<sup>1</sup> that provide that every citizen has the right of access to information held by the state or any person that is required for the protection of right or fundamental freedom.
2. The registrar of birth and deaths to strengthen the registration process and ensure that an accurate and up to date list of deaths and births are

available. This should be availed online for the public to verify and give feedback on its accuracy.

#### **D). Kenya National Bureau of Statistics**

1. To undertake Housing and Population census for both in country and citizens in the diaspora to determine their demographic data.

#### **E). The Parliament**

1. To amend the Constitution to either provide for the integration of civil and voter registration processes or to provide for mandatory voter registration for all eligible voters. This will help realize 100% voter registration rates.
2. To ensure diaspora representation in parliament. This will ensure that the diaspora voting right issue is often put on the agenda for deliberations and decision-making in the parliament.
3. Legal framework changes should not be done during the electoral year. Clear timelines should be provided on legal reforms. This should include election related litigation.

#### **F). The National Treasury**

1. That the national treasury through the parliament should provide adequate and timely finances to facilitate the implementation of continuous civic/ voter education within the entire electoral cycle both within and outside the country.

#### **G). Ministry of Education, Science and Technology**

1. To finalize the integration of Voter education in the new education curriculum of 2-6-6-3

#### **H. Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) should work together and ensure that a Housing and Population Census for citizens in the diaspora is undertaken in August, 2019 when the country population census will be conducted. The data will inform logistical planning and development of diaspora registration and voting policy.

2. ELOG recommends that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KNBS establish and maintain a structured engagement with diaspora non-state actors such as KDA and other Diaspora Organizations that have diaspora data to support diaspora Census initiative.

#### **I. Political Parties**

1. Political parties to strengthen their women wing by coming up with effective strategies for reaching out to women voters.
2. To develop regulation on the implementation of the 30% Political party fund meant for marginalized groups.

#### **J. Citizens Elections Observer Groups/ Organizations**

1. Should continue to engage youth as observers.
2. Should build synergy in election observation, advocate and speak in one voice on issues that impact on electoral integrity.
3. K. NGO's / CSOs

The NGOs/CBOs should strengthen their Voter Education strategies at the grass root level and more particularly work with the Community Based Organizations (CBO).

<sup>50</sup> Refer to Article 35 (b) of the Constitution

## CHAPTER 6

### LIMITATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT

The main limitation of the VLA exercise was lack of complete and accurate external data to determine the external consistency of the Voter registration statistics. For Example, ELOG was not able to get official registration data for persons with disabilities from National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPD) making it impossible to determine registration rates for PWDs. Most of the external data that ELOG used during the VLA exercise was that which was shared by KMPG by state departments that capture data crucial for voter registration. Also, the rainy weather hampered the VLA fieldwork hence ELOG was not able to realize a 100% response rate. Some of the lessons learnt include need for proper timing to ensure that VLA findings and recommendations inform the compilation of the final register before elections.

# CHAPTER 7

## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: VLA Questionnaire



#### Assessment of the 2017 Register of Voters: People to List – Sampling Instructions

Interviewer ID				Respondent ID				Data Entry ID			
I	D			R	D			D	D		

Location Information			Supervisor use only		
County			Respondent back-checked?	Yes	1
Constituency				No	2
Ward			Questionnaire checked by		
Polling station name					
Polling station code			Signature		
Polling station category	Urban	1			
	Rural	2			

Notes:

- Please write clearly. Pay attention while writing numbers. Write in an understandable way.
- Complete each question at a time paying attention to responses from the respondents and skip patterns.
- All questions should be completed **EXCEPT** those that appear on the page marked '**For Official Use Only**'. This should be left blank to be filled later by ELOG secretariat

#### Household Selection Procedure

It is your job to select a random (any) household. A household is a group of people who presently live and eat together from the same pot. Your supervisor will select the sampling start point for each polling station. Use a 5 (for rural) or 10 (for urban) interval pattern to select a household. That is, walking towards the sun away from the start point. For rural polling station, select the 5<sup>th</sup> household for the first interview, counting houses on both the right and the left (and starting with those on the right if they are opposite each other). Once you leave your first interview, continue in the same direction, and count select the fifth house again. If the settlement comes to an end and there are no more houses, turn at right angles to the right and keep walking, continuing to count until finding the tenth dwelling. For urban polling station, select the 10<sup>th</sup> household for the first interview and select the 20<sup>th</sup> household for the second interview, and so on and so forth.

If you are unable to speak with anybody in the household throughout the course of the day, use the table below to record your progress until you make a successful call. Replace by the NEXT numbered household on your list.

<b>History of Successful &amp; Unsuccessful Attempts for this survey</b>	Household 1	Household 2	Household 3	Household 4	Household 5	Household 6	Household 7
Successful	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Reason for failure:							
Refused to be interviewed	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Refused to consent to be interviewed	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Person selected was never at home after at least two visits	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Household/ premises empty for the survey period after at least two visits	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Not a citizen/ spoke only a foreign language	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Deaf/ did not speak a survey language	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Did not fit gender quota	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
No adults in household	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Other (specify)	11	11	11	11	11	11	11

If no one is at home (i.e. premises empty), substitute with the very next household. If the interview is refused, use an interval of 5 for rural and 10 for urban areas to select a substitute household, counting houses on both the right and the left. When you find a household with someone at home, please introduce yourself using the following script. You must learn and understand this introduction so that you can say it exactly as it is written below.

Good morning/afternoon. My name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am from the Elections Observation Group (ELOG), a long-term and permanent national platform comprising of civil society and faith-based organizations with the aim of strengthening democracy and good governance in Kenya by promoting transparency and accountability in electoral processes, citizens' participation in electoral processes through non-partisan, impartial domestic observation and objective reporting. ELOG has been implementing a one-year project with an aim of safeguarding the integrity of the 2017 general

elections. One of the activities included the assessment of the quality of the 2017 register of voters; that is to determine how accurately the 2017 register of voters represents all eligible voters in Kenya. We are here to do that with you. Some people will be selected randomly and their particulars will be verified in the register of voters. The results of this study will also help the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to improve the quality of the register for future elections.

Your household has been selected at random and you are part of the 2,400 people we are speaking to. Your participation will be kept confidential. Your responses will be put together with other people to get an overall picture regarding the accuracy of the register of voters. The interview will take about 30 minutes. There is no penalty for refusing to participate/participation is voluntary. Do you wish to proceed? First, we would like to choose one person from your household to take the interview. Would you help us pick one?

*Habari za asubuhi/mchana. Jina langu ni \_\_\_\_\_ kutoka kundi la waangalizi wa Uchaguzi (ELOG). ELOG ni jukwaa la kudumu la kitaifa linalojumuisha mashirika ya kiraia na mashirika yenye imani kwa nia ya kuimarisha demokrasia na utawala bora nchini Kenya kwa kuendeleza uwazi na uwajibikaji katika michakato ya uchaguzi. Shughuli moja ya ELOG ni kukadiria usahihi wa rejista ya wapigakura ya mwaka 2017. Hii ina maana ya kutathmini ni kwa njia gani rejista ya wapigakura inawakilisha wapigakura wote wanaofaa nchini Kenya. Tuko hapa kutekeleza hilo jukumu na wewe. Baadhi ya watu watachaguliwa bila mpangilio maalum na yanayowatambulisha yatahakikishwa katika rejista ya wapigakura. Matokeo ya uchunguzi huu yatasaidia Tume Huru ya Uchaguzi na Mipaka (IEBC) kustawisha ubora wa rejista kwa uchaguzi wa baadaye.*

*Nyumba yako imechaguliwa kutumia bahati nasibu na wewe ni mmoja wa watu 2,400 ambao tunazungumza nao. Kushiriki kwako kutawekwa siri. Majibu yako yatajumuishwa na yale ya watu wengine ili kupata picha ya kijumla kuhusu usahihi wa rejista ya wapigakura. Mahojiano yatachukua kama dakika 30. Hautalaumiwa kwa kukataa kushiriki. Je, ungependa tuendelee?*

*Kwanza, tungependa kumchagua mtu mmoja kutoka kwa nyumba hii kushiriki katika mahojiano. Je, utatusaidia kumchagua mmoja?*

Was consent given?	No	0	Select another household
	Yes	1	

Note: The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively. If participation is refused, walk away from the household and record this in the above table on “History of Successful and Unsuccessful Attempts for this Survey.” Substitute the household using an interval of 10 households for urban areas and 5 for rural areas. If consent is secured/granted, proceed to Respondent Selection.

### Respondent Selection Procedure

Within the household, it is your job to select an individual at random. This individual becomes the interview respondent. In addition, you are responsible for alternating interviews between **men** and **women**. Circle the correct code below. Note that “First Interview” should **ONLY** be used for your very first day of fieldwork in each polling station, NOT your first interview every day.

	First interview	Male	Female
<b>PrevInt.</b> Previous interview was with a:		1	2
<b>ThisInt.</b> This interview must be with a:		1	2

Please tell me the names of all males/ females [select correct gender] who presently live in this household.

I only want the names of males/ females [select correct gender] who are Kenyan citizens and born before 17<sup>th</sup> May 1999, - the register ELOG is auditing is dated which date? This means that any one born before 17th May 1999. This is because Continuous Voter registration continued up to 17th May despite MVR ending in February 2017 was 18 years and above by 17th May 2017 when voter registration for the 08<sup>th</sup> August 2017 general elections was closed.

// *Tafadhali niambie majina yote ya wanaume/ wanawake [select correct gender] ambao kwa sasa wanaishi kwenye nyumba hii. Kwa sasa ninataka majina ya wanaume/wanawake pekee [select correct gender] ambaye ni raia wa Kenya na aliyezaliwa kabla ya 17th May 2017.*

*If this interview must be a female, list only women's names. If this interview is with a male, list only men's names. List all eligible household members of this gender who are 18 years or older, even those not presently at home but will return to the house at any time that day or tomorrow/ the following day.*

Women's Names	Men's Names
1.	1.
2.	2.
3.	3.
4.	4.
5.	5.
6.	6.
7.	7.
8.	8.
9.	9.
10.	10.

Take out your deck of numbered cards. Present them face down so that numbers cannot be seen. Ask the person who is selecting respondents to pick any card, by saying:

**Please choose a card. The person who corresponds to the number chosen will be the person interviewed.**

***Tafadhali chagua kadi. Mtu ambaye atalingana na namba ambayo itachaguliwa ndiye atakayehojiwa.***

*[Remember to circle the code number of the person selected on the table above.]*

<b>The person I need to speak is [insert name] _____ . Is this person presently at home?</b>	
<b><i>Mtu ambaye ninataka kuzungumza naye ni [insert name] _____. Je, mtu huyu yuko nyumbani kwa sasa?</i></b>	
If yes:	<b>May I please interview this person now? // <i>Ninaweza kumhoji mtu huyu sasa?</i></b>
If no:	<b>Will this person return here at any time today or tomorrow? // <i>Mtu huyu atarudi hapa wakati wowote leo?</i></b>
If no:	<b>Thank you very much. I will select another household. // <i>Asante sana. Nitachagua nyumba nyingine.</i></b> <i>[Substitute with the next household to the right and repeat the respondent selection procedure. YOU CAN ONLY SUBSTITUTE HOUSEHOLDS NOT INDIVIDUALS]</i>
If yes:	<b>Please tell this person that I will return for an interview at _____ [insert convenient time].</b> <b>// <i>Tafadhali mwambia mtu huyu kuwa nitarudi kwa mahojiano saa [insert convenient time].</i></b> <i>[If this respondent is not present when you call back twice, then replace this household with the next household to the right]</i>

If the selected respondent is not the same person that you first met, repeat introduction:

Good morning/afternoon. My name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am from the Elections Observation Group (ELOG), a long-term and permanent national platform comprising of civil society and faith-based organizations with the aim of strengthening democracy and good governance in Kenya by promoting transparency and accountability in electoral processes, citizens' participation in electoral processes through non-partisan, impartial domestic observation and objective reporting. ELOG has been implementing a one-year project with an aim of safeguarding the integrity of the 2017 general elections. One of the activities included the assessment of the quality of the 2017 register of voters; that is to determine how accurately the 2017 register of voters represents all eligible voters in Kenya. We are here to do that with you. Some people will be selected randomly, and their particulars will be verified in the register of voters. The results of this study will also help the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to improve the quality of the register for future elections.

Your household has been selected at random and you are part of the 2,400 people we are speaking to. Your participation will be kept confidential. Your responses will be put together with other people to get an overall picture regarding the accuracy of the register of voters. The interview will take about 30 minutes. There is no penalty for refusing to participate/participation is voluntary. Do you wish to proceed? First, we would like to choose one person from your household to take the interview. Would you help us pick one?

*Habari za asubuhi/mchana. Jina langu ni \_\_\_\_\_. Natoka katika Kikundi Cha Uchaguzi (ELOG). ELOG ni jukwaa la muda mrefu na la kudumu la kitaifa linalojumuisha mashirika ya kiraia na mashirika yenye imani kwa nia ya kuimarisha demokrasia na utawala bora nchini Kenya kwa kuendeleza uwazi na uwajibikaji katika michakato ya uchaguzi, ushiriki wa wananchi katika michakato ya uchaguzi kwa njia ya wasiokuwa wafuasi na wasio na upendeleo wa ndani. Shughuli moja ya ELOG ni kukadiria ubora wa rejista ya wapigakura ya mwaka 2017. Hii ina maana ya kutathmini ni kwa njia gani rejista ya wapigakura inawakilisha wapigakura wote wanaofaa nchini Kenya. Tuko hapa kutekeleza hilo jukumu na wewe. Baadhi ya watu watachaguliwa bila mpangilio maalum na yanayowatambulisha yatahakikishwa katika rejista ya wapigakura. Matokeo ya uchunguzi huu yatasaidia Tume Huru ya Uchaguzi na Mipaka (IEBC) kustawisha ubora wa rejista kwa uchaguzi wa baadaye.*

*Nyumba yako imechaguliwa bila utaratibu wowote na wewe ni sehemu ya watu 2,400 ambao tunazungumza nao. Kushiriki kwako kutawekwa siri. Majibu yako yatawekwa pamoja na yale ya watu wengine ili kupata picha ya kijumla kuhusu usahihi wa rejista ya wapigakura. Mahojiano yatachukua kama dakika 30. Hautaadhibiwa kwa kukataa kushiriki. Je, ungependa tuendelee?*

*Kwanza, tungependa kumchagua mtu mmoja kutoka kwa nyumba hii kushiriki katika mahojiano. Je, utatusaidia kumchagua mmoja?*

Note: The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively. If participation is refused, walk away from the household and record this in the above table on "History of Successful and Unsuccessful Attempts for this Survey". Substitute the household using an interval of 10 households. If consent is secured/granted, proceed with the interview after recording number of calls, and current date and time



## Assessment of the Register of Voters: People to List – Questionnaire

Interviewer ID		Respondent ID		Data Entry ID
Date of Interview		Date	Month	Year
Enter date, month, and year				
Start time		Hour	Minutes	
Time interview started (use 24-hour time format)				

### A. Voter Registration Information

Q1	Are you a registered voter?	Yes, I am a registered voter	1	<b>Go to Q5</b>
		No, I am not a registered voter	2	<b>Go to Q2</b>
Q2	Have you ever attempted to register to vote?	Yes	1	<b>Go to Q3</b>
		No	2	<b>Go to Q4</b>
Q3	If yes, why could you not register? <i>[Do not read the options Tick only one]</i>	I do not have an ID document.	1	<b>Go to Q15</b>
		I tried to register but was turned away	2	
		I registered but was removed from the list/was not on the list	3	
		I was pressured/threatened to not register.	4	
		Others, <i>specify</i> _____	99	
		Refused to answer	999	
Q4	If no, why did you not register to vote? <i>[Do not read the options]</i>	I was not aware about the voter registration period	1	<b>Go to Q15</b>
		I do not live in this area	2	
		The registration process is too difficult for me	3	
		I do not have an ID document for voter registration	4	
		I am not interested in voting/being registered	5	
		The registration timeline was too short	6	
		The distance to the registration center is too far	7	
		I was sick/disabled	8	
		There is no financial or material benefits for me to register	9	
		Others, <i>specify</i> _____	99	
		Refused to answer	999	

Q5	How did you get registered to the register of voters that was used on 8 <sup>th</sup> August 2017 General Elections?  <i>[Do not read the options, Choose 1]</i>	Registered at the registration center	1	
		The registration officer visited the house and directly registered me	2	
		Registered at the church/ mosque	3	
		Others, <i>specify</i> _____	99	
Q6	What kind of identity document did you use when you registered? <i>[Do not read the options, Choose 1]</i>	National ID Card	1	
		Passport	2	
		National ID waiting card	3	
		Police abstract	4	
		Registered without document	5	
		Others, <i>specify</i> _____	99	
		Do not remember	999	
Q7	Why did you decide to register to vote?  <i>[do not mention the options]</i> <i>[check all that apply]</i>	It is my right.	1	
		Because other people around were registered	2	
		I was encouraged to register	3	
		So I can vote in the elections	4	
		I was forced to	5	
		I can sell my vote during the campaigns and elections	6	
		Others, <i>specify</i> _____	99	
		Refused to answer	999	
Q8	Place where the respondent registered.	Registration center :		
		County Assembly Ward :		
		Constituency :		
		County :		
Q9	Did you experience any challenges or problems during the Voter Registration?  <i>[Do not read the options, Choose 1]</i>	No, the process was simple & easy	1	
		Was not aware of BVR kit movement	2	
		The registration process was too complicated	3	
		The BVR kit failed /did not work	4	
		The process took too much time	5	
		BVR kit could not capture some of my details	6	
		The registration timeline was too short	7	
		The distance to the registration center was too far	8	
		Others, <i>specify</i> _____	99	

Q10	Did you check your details in the voters register during the 30 days that the IEBC provided for inspection?	Yes	1	Go to Q11
		No	2	Go to Q12
Q11	If yes, how did you verify your details in the voters' register? <i>[Do not read the options, Choose 1]</i>	Visited the registration center where I registered	1	Go to Q13
		Used the SMS method provided	2	
		Used the election commission website	3	
		Others, specify _____	99	
Q12	Why did you choose not to verify & check your registration status? <i>[Do not read the options, Choose 1]</i>	I believed that my name is in the list already	1	Go to Q15
		I was not aware of the verification period	2	
		I do not understand how to verify	3	
		The voter polling station is too far	4	
		I was busy/not regular at home	5	
		I am too old/sick/disabled	6	
		I moved away/travelled from the centre	7	
		Others, specify _____	99	
Q13	Did you make any corrections to your details as they appeared on the register?	Yes	1	Go to Q14
		No	2	Go to Q15
Q14	If yes, what were the corrections?  <i>[do not mention the options]</i> <i>[check all that apply]</i>	My names were captured wrongly	1	
		My ID/passport number was wrongly captured?	2	
		My gender was captured wrongly	3	
		My polling station was wrongly captured	4	
		My Names and other details were completely missing from the register	5	
		Others, specify _____	99	
Q15	Do you plan to remain and vote in this same location/ward for the 2022 general elections?	Yes	1	
		No	2	
		Undecided	3	
<b>A. Respondent's Data (as they appear in the document used during Registration)</b>				
Q16	What document did you use to register?	National Identity Card (ID)	1	Go to Q17
		Valid Kenyan Passport	2	Go to Q22
		Not Registered	3	Go to Q29
Q17	Can I have a look at your national ID?	Yes, ID card seen	1	Go to Q18
		Yes, but ID card not seen	2	Go to Q20
		No, I do not have it	3	Go to Q21

Q18	National ID number as indicated on the ID card																			
Q19	ID card serial number as indicated on the ID card																			
Q20	Kindly tell me your ID card number																			
	Can't remember to answer	99																		
Q21	Where is your ID Card?  <i>[Do not read the options, Choose 1]</i>	I lost mine	1	Go to Q29																
		I have applied but it's not yet ready	2																	
		My spouse/relative kept mine	3																	
		Somebody took it from me illegally/ by force	4																	
		Others, specify _____	99																	
Q22	Can I have a look at your passport?	Yes, passport seen	1	Go to Q23																
		Yes, but passport not seen	2	Go to Q24																
		No, I do not have it	3	Go to Q25																
Q23	Passport number as indicated on the passport																			
Q24	Kindly tell me your passport number <i>Don't remember to answer</i>																			
		999																		
Q25	Where is your passport?	I lost mine	1	Go to Q29																
		I have applied but it's not yet ready	2																	
		My spouse/relative kept mine	3																	
		Somebody took it from me illegally/ by force	4																	
		Others, specify _____	99																	

*[Interviewer: For respondents' who said they have registered, please use the ID or the passport that they used for the registration and fill in Q26-Q28 below or if the respondent does not have an ID card or passport ask Q20,21,24 &25-*

Q26	Respondent's name as in the ID or document they use (or used for registration)	Full Names:											
Q27	Gender	Male	1										
		Female	2										
Q28	Date of birth	Day _____ Month _____ Year _____	-										
		Don't remember	999										
Q29	Marital status	Single	1										
		Married	2										
		Other, specify _____	99										

Q30	What is your religion?	Christian	1	
		Islam	2	
		Hinduism	3	
		Sikhism	4	
		Atheist	5	
		Other, <i>specify</i> _____	99	

Q31	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	Did not attend school/ no formal schooling	1	
		Informal schooling only	2	
		Primary school	3	
		Secondary school	4	
		Tertiary level	5	
		University completed	6	
		Post graduate	7	
		Refused to answer	999	

Q32	What is your current profession/ occupation? <i>[Do not read options]</i>	Unemployed	1	
		Farmer	2	
		Self-employed	3	
		Home Maker	4	
		Student	5	
		Trader/ artisan	6	
		Employed by private sector/ NGOs	7	
		Employed in the public sector	8	
		Military/ police	9	
		Others, <i>specify</i> _____	99	
		Refused to answer	999	

Q33	Telephone number of the respondent (optional)			
-----	---	--	--	--

#### B. Others Information and Respondents Opinion

Q34	What was your main source of information on the Voter Registration (BVR) process  <i>[Do not read the options, Choose 1]</i>	Church/ mosque	1	
		Printed media (newspaper, magazine)	2	
		Radio/TV	3	
		Social Media	4	
		Banners/ posters/ stickers	5	
		Chief/sub-chief	6	
		Election Commission Officials – voter education	7	
		Political party/ campaign team	8	
		Family/ friends/ neighbors	9	
		NGOs/ CBOs	10	
Others, <i>specify</i> _____	99			

Q35	Are you aware of anybody who was a registered voter but just passed away in this neighborhood in the past 6 months?	No, I don't know anybody who just passed away	1	Go to Q37
		Yes.	2	Go to Q36
Q36	<i>If Yes [Please provide the name. If the respondent only knows the name, you need to go to a family member of the deceased or chief]</i>	a. Name : b. ID number : c. Date of birth :		
Q37	Do you have any confidence in the Electoral process?	Yes	1	
		No	2	
		some Confidence	3	
Q38	Did you vote during the 8 <sup>th</sup> August 2017	Yes	1	
		No	2	<b>Go to Q39</b>
Q39	If no, why not?  <i>[Do not read the options, Choose 1]</i>	I was not registered at that time	1	
		I could not find my polling station	2	
		I could not find my name on the polling station list	3	
		I was not interested	4	
		I was busy at work/did not get leave/sick	5	
		I had travelled away from home	6	
		Other, <i>specify</i> _____	99	
		Refused to answer	999	
Q40	What is the estimated distance from your home to the polling station?	Very near – about 5 minutes' walk	1	
		Near – Between 5 to 20 minutes' walk	2	
		Far – Between 30 minutes and 1-hour walk	3	
		Very Far – More than 1-hour walk	4	
		Not able to tell	999	
Q41	Time interview ended (use 24-hour time format)	Hour	Minute	
<b>C. Interviewer Evaluation</b> <i>[should be answered by the interviewer]</i>				
Q42	Is the respondent able bodied or living with disability?	Person living with disability	1	
		Able bodied/ not disabled	2	
Q43	Did anyone try to stop you from conducting the interview?	Yes, please specify	1	
		No	2	

Q44	Overall, what would you say was the respondent's attitude toward the interview?	Interested and involved	1		
		Friendly	2		
		Impatient	3		
		Worried and nervous	4		
		Hostile	5		
Q45	Interviewer details	Name _____ :			
		Gender	Male	1	
			Female	2	
Language of the interview: _____					
Q46	<b>Interviewer:</b> Do you have any comments on the interview? For example, did anything happen during the interview	No	0		
		Yes, <i>please specify</i>	1		
I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with instructions received during training. All responses recorded here are those of the respondents who were pre-selected.					
Interviewer Signature: _____					
Q47	<b>Supervisor:</b> Do you have any comments on the interview? For example, did anything happen during the interview	No	0		
		Yes, <i>please specify</i>	1		
To the best of my knowledge, I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with instructions received during training. All responses recorded here are those of the respondents who were pre-selected.					
Supervisor Signature: _____					

**Final Instruction:**

Make sure you check your questionnaire item by item immediately after completing the interview just to make sure all items are correctly filled in and for completeness before you start the next interview. After doing so, pass your completed questionnaire to your supervisor for him/ her also to cross check further before you leave the Polling Station Unit (PSU). Any incomplete interviews will be redone under supervision at the interviewer own costs.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**



**Assessment of Register of voters  
People to List – Presence on the voters list  
(To be filled by ELOG Secretariat)**

Interviewer ID	Respondent ID	Data Entry ID
----------------	---------------	---------------

Q48	Have the respondent registered as a voter in the voter's list?	No, the respondent is not registered	1	Stop
		Yes, the respondent is registered in the same polling station where ELOG found him/her	2	
		Yes, the respondent is registered in other polling station. <i>Please specify:</i> County : Constituency : Ward : PS Code : PS Name :	3	
		Yes, the respondent registered in multiple polling stations. <i>Please specify:</i> County : Constituency : Ward : PS Code : PS Name :	4	

Q49	Did the ID number match with the register?	Yes	1	
		Does not match/ incomplete	2	

Q50	Did the names match with the register?	Yes	1	
		Does not match/ incomplete	2	

Q51	Did the date of birth match with the register?	Yes	1	
		Does not match/ incomplete	2	

Q52	Did the respondent's gender match with the register?	Yes	1	
		Does not match/ incomplete	2	

## Appendix 2: CEC Interview Guide



### ASSESSMENT OF THE 2017 REGISTER OF VOTERS:

#### INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE CONSTITUENCY ELECTIONS COORDINATORS (CECS)

##### Section 1: Demographic Details

Constituency Name	
CEC's Name (Optional)	
Gender of CEC	Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/>
Disability Status of CEC	Disabled <input type="checkbox"/> Not Disabled <input type="checkbox"/>
CECs Tel. No	
ELOG Supervisors Name	
ELOG Supervisors Tel. No.	
Date and Time of Interview	

##### **Instructions Script**

Good morning/afternoon. My name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am from the Elections Observation Group (ELOG), a long-term and permanent national platform comprising of civil society and faith-based organizations with the aim of strengthening democracy and good governance in Kenya by promoting transparency and accountability in electoral processes, citizens' participation in electoral processes through non-partisan, impartial domestic observation and objective reporting. ELOG has been implementing a one-year project with an aim of safeguarding the integrity of the 2017 general elections. One of the activities included the assessment of the quality of the 2017 register of voters; that is to determine how accurately the 2017 register of voters represents all eligible voters. The assessment is being conducted in all the 290 Constituencies and you are one of the 290 Constituency Elections Coordinators we are speaking to. Your participation will be kept confidential. Your responses will be put together with other CEC's views to get an overall picture regarding voter registration and the register for purposes of informing interventions and strategies for improvement. The interview will take about 30 minutes.

##### **Section 2: Information about voter registration in the Constituency**

1. What is the approximate population of this constituency?.....
2. What percentage of the population is eligible to vote (those who are 18 years and above).....

3. One of your mandate as CEC is to maintain a register of voters for this constituency, could you kindly share with us the number of registered voters for this constituency disaggregated by male, gender, PWDs, youth and non-youth.

Total Registered voters	Female	Male	PWDs	Youth (below 35)	Non- Youth (Above 35)

4. What are your views on the accessibility of polling stations by voters in your constituency?.....  
 .....  
 .....
5. What would you say are the main challenges that you face during voter registration and maintaining an accurate register of voters?.....  
 .....  
 .....
6. What are your suggestions on how to improve voter registration and maintaining a credible register for this Constituency?.....  
 .....  
 .....

## Appendix 3: Back checking form



### ASSESSMENT OF THE 2017 REGISTER OF VOTERS

#### SUPERVISOR'S BACK CHECKING FORM (To be completed for each interview that is back checked)

Supervisors Name:			
County Name:			
Constituency Name:			
Ward Name			
Polling station Name:			
Interviewer's Name:			
Respondent's Name:			
Date Respondent was Interviewed by the interviewer			
Household selection: Was the standard selection protocol followed? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>		(Explain)	
Respondent selection: Was the standard selection protocol followed? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>		(Explain)	
Approximate interview duration: How long did the interview take with the Interviewer?			
Supervisor: Indicate Questions asked for verification	Outcome as per the back check	Outcome as per the interviewer	What was the mode of verification? (Physical, telephonic etc)
Q1			
Q24			
Q33			

## Appendix 4: Spot checking form



### ASSESSMENT OF THE 2017 REGISTER OF VOTERS

#### SPOT CHECKING FORM (To be completed for each interview that is Spot checked)

Spot Checkers Name:			
County Name:			
Constituency Name:			
Polling station Name:			
Ward Name			
Interviewer Name			
Respondent's Name:			
Date Respondent was Interviewed by the interviewer			
Was the interview back-checked? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>		(Explain)	
Household selection: Was the standard selection protocol followed? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>		(Explain)	
Respondent selection: Was the standard selection protocol followed? (Explain)			
Approximate interview duration: How long did the interview take with the Interviewer?			
Spot checker: Indicate Questions asked for verification	Outcome as per the spot check	Outcome as per the interviewer	What was the mode of verification? (Physical, telephonic etc)
Q1			
Q24			
Q33			